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INTRODUCTION 
The National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA) is a private, non-
profit, national membership organization dedicated to the provision of quality legal 
services for poor people. NLADA, along with other organizations and individuals, 
has recognized that poor defendants in this country: who face the ultimate criminal 
sanction -- death -- frequently do not receive adequate representation from their 
government-supplied lawyers. 
Capital defendants eligible for the appointment of counsel are often provided 
the serv ices of attorneys who are inexperienced or otherwise unqualified to handle 
the high-stakes, complex litigation involved in a death penalty case. Attorneys 
who do have adequate experience and personal skills are often not provided the 
resources to adequately assist their clients. 
These Standards constitute an attempt to improve the quality of 
representation afforded to poor defendants charged with C.:ipi tal offenses. Some 
national s tandards have been written for appointment of counsel for eligible 
defendants generally, general standards for defense counsel ha1e been esublished, 
and specific Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation exist in 
draft form. While some local standards may exist for capital re?resentation, 
national standards on the assignment and performance of counsel in capital cases 
did not exist prior to these Standards. 
Each of these Standards is followed by a commentary which sets out the 
rationale for the Standard. Primary and secondary authorities are included. 
"Should" is used as a mandatory term -- what counsel "should" do is intended as a 





STANDARD 1.1 OBJECTIVE 
The objective in providing counsel in cases in which the death penalty is 
sought should be to ensure that quality legal representation is afforded to 
defendants eligible for the appointment of counsel during all stages of the case. 
Commentary: 
In 1932, Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the United States Supreme Court 
in Powell v. Alabama, a death penalty case, said: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it 
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the 
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of 
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is 
unfamillar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel 
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to 
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against 
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
1 
of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. -
Fifty-five years later, death penalty cases have become so specialized that 
defense counsel has duties and functions definably different from those of counsel 
in ordinary criminal cases.I The quality of counsel's "guiding hand" in modern 
capital cases is crucial. At every stage of a capital case, counsel rnust be aware of 
specialized and frequently changing legal principles and rules, and be able to 
develop strategies applying them in the pressure-filled environment of high-stakes, 
complex litigation. 
Trial attorneys in death penalty cases must be able to apply sophisticated 
jury selection techniques, including attempted rehabilitation of venire members 
who initially state opposition to the death penalty. This is set out infra in Standard 
l 1.7.2 and accompanying commentary. Counsel must be experienced in the 
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utilization of expert witnesses and evidence, such as psychiatric and forensic 
evidence, Standard l l .4. l(d)(7), 1 l .8.6(a)(3), and must be able to zealously 
challenge the prosecution's evidence and experts through effective cross 
examination. Ut ilization of experts has become the rule, rather than the 
exception, in proper preparation of capital cases.l 
A capital trial is, in substance, two separate trials -- the guilty/not guilty 
trial and the penalty trial.i Investigation of and planning for both phases must 
begin immediately upon counsel's entry into the case, Standard 11.4.l. Counsel 
must at that time attempt to obtain the investigative resources necessary to 
prepare for both phases, Standards 11.4.1; 11.5.1 (b)(9). Substantial pretrial 
investigation is a necessary base for intelligent assessment of possibly conflicting 
options as to the defense. Trial counsel must coordinate and integrate the 
evidence presented during the guilt phase with the projected evidence supporting 
an affirmative case for life at the penalty phase, see Standard 11.7. l and Standard 
11 .8. 
In many capital cases, no credible argument for innocence exists, so that the 
life or death issue of punishment is the real focus of the entire case.2- The 
Constitution requires individual ization of the capital sentencing process. ,-\ capital 
defendant has the right to present his or her sentencer with a ny mit igating 
evidence that might save his or her life.~ Counsel shou ld be aware of methods t o 
effectively advocate for the life of the client, and should strive for an effective 
defense presentation in every case, Standard 11.8. l et ~-
Currently, many indigent capital defendants are not receiving the assistance 
of a lawyer sufficiently skilled in practice to render quality assistance.Z- The facts 
set out in many published opinions provide graphic examples of inadequate 





In a Mississippi case, counsel's failure to present evidence during the 
sentencing phase left the jury unaware that the defendant was mentally retarded.1 
In a Florida case, assigned counsel never discussed the defendant's background with 
him, did not investigate for helpful sentencing phase evidence, and made a closing 
argument in which he indicated to the jury that he was representing the defendant 
reluctantly.! In a Georgia case, the defendant was procedurally barred from 
raising a meritorious jury claim based on the discriminatory selection method 
because his volunteer lawyer failed to raise the issue at trial.lQ In a California 
case, counsel's failure to introduce evidence of the defendant's life history, 
character, and mental condition was compounded by his closing-argument 
characterization of the defendant -- his client -- as a "monster.".!..!. 
Justice \iarshall noted when dissenting from a denial of a petition for 
certiorari in one case that t~e attorney had failed to investigate mitigating 
circumstances for his client, remaining ignorant of the potential testimony of many 
favorable witnesses including a city councilman, a forr ner prosecutor, a 
professional football player, a bank vice-president and several teachers, coaches, 
friends and family members. Counsel's sole strategy to a·,o id the death penalty 
was to seek a bar to its imp0sition because the state had 6 i ,en only 0ral notice of 
the aggravating circumstances upon which it would rely. The notice statute in 
question did not specify written notice, and no state court had ever required 
written notice, yet counsel "was content to rest his entire defense, and the fate of 
his client, on an untried legal theory".!l which was rejected. The client was 
sentenced to death. 
In a Wyoming case in which defense counsel had competently conducted the 
guilt phase of a complex and lengthy capital case, Chief Justice Rose noted in a 
separate opinion in the State Supreme Court that the record revealed a serious 
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problem at the penalty phase. When asked by the trial judge how much time he 
would need for the sentencing hearing, counsel had replied: "Two minutes. I'm 
serious. I have been in this position probably more than anybody in this room, 
multiplied by 5, okay, and there ain't nothing you can say. They (the jury) will do 
what they want and there is no point."11 
These and many other examples of poor performance by trial counselil 
cannot be ignored on the theory that appellate or post conviction review will cure 
trial level error; in several instances deficient performance has not led to reversal. 
Due to the significant burdens placed upon defendants who challenge the adequacy 
of trial counsel,.!1 the reluctance of appellate courts to grant relief based on 
unfairness in jury selection,l2. and the limits placed on federal courts to review 
habeas corpus claims of constitutional error ,lZ the trial of capital defendants has 
become "virtually the whole ball game.".!! While some clients in capital cases do 
obtain relief on direct appeal and in post conviction proceedings,.!1 the best way to 
ensure that effective assistance of counsel is being provided is to attain greater 
quality control at the trial level. 5 tandard 1. 1 there fore rnanda tes quality 
re::,resentation at the trial level of a c3pital case. 
The importance of quality legal representation at the trial phase of a capital 
case does not, on the other hand, diminish the need for quality representation at 
the post judgment level. The Federal Constitution guarantees the right to 
effective assistance of counsel on an appeal by right,20 and other post judgment 
procedures are equally important in capital cases. The guiding hand of counsel 
must lead the condemned client through all available avenues of review. Decisions 
of an exceedingly technical nature must be :nade k:,&. whether to raise all 
discernible issues or only the strong ones on appeal, ~ Standard 11.9.2 and 




· l . ·1 11 l · 21 of trial counsel on the d1rect appea or wa1 t unt1 co a tera proceed1ngs).-
Appellate counsel must be familiar with the procedures for post appellate 
challenges in order to avoid any inadvertent waiver on appeal of issues that should 
be raised later, Standard 11.9.2 and commentary. 
While the Federal Constitutional right to counsel has not been extended to 
collateral post conviction proceedings,22 the need for quality post conviction 
representation is nonetheless vital. Death row inmates who have found counsel to 
represent them in post conviction proceedings in the federal courts have secured 
rulings that their constitutional rights have been violated in a much higher 
percentage of cases than is typical of criminal appeals generally.23 
Collateral proceedings present yet another set of obstacles unique to capital 
cases. In addition to the general, often difficult procedural requirements common 
to all habeas corpus actions, death penalty cases may be subject to rules that 
provide less time for preparation than is available in non<apital cases.2~ 
Substantive pleadings may have to be prepared simultaneously with, or even be 
delayed for, pleadings to stay the client's execution, Standard 11.9.5. Only quality 
legal representation can see a defendant fairly through the rnaze of post judgment 
proceedings. 
At least one state already provides for the .1ppointment of counsel for 
collateral proceedings.25 Capital defendants should not be subject to a "luck of 
the draw" with respect to counsel following an unsuccessful appeat.1.2. Standard 1.1 
mandates quality representation for indigents in a capital case through post 
conviction proceedings. 
A general statement of high purpose alone will not suffice to ensure high 
quality representation. Attorney error is often the result of systemic problems, 
not individual deficiency. The provision of counsel for indigent capital defendants 
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(where counsel is provided at all) often incorporates the worst features of the 
universally condemned ad hoc system for assigning counsel, wh ich is at od ds with 
the notion of quality representation.
27 
De fender offices generally have the 
experience and dedication to provide quality representation in capital cases, but 
some individual defenders and many assigned counsel lack sufficient experience and 
dedication. Those attorneys who have adequate experience are often overworked 
and inadequately funded.il lnexper ienced attorneys opera ting without support or 
supervision may find themselves "in over the ir heads", unable to make up with 
devotion their insufficient train ing and lack of resources. The Standards that 
follow address not just the goal of quality representation, but the systematic 
provision of guidelines and resources to ensure that the goal is reached. They are 
intended to apply to defender o f fi ces as well as to indiv idual assigned counsel, ~-
to all provision of counsel to indigent c apital defendants. 
Counsel whose advocacy does not reflect the highest standards of 
competency at each level of a cap i tal case increases the "risk that the death 
penalty will be imposed in sp ite o f factors wh ich rn a y c:dl for a less severe 
penalty _,.29 On the basis of the above practice nor rn s a nd constitut ional 
requirements, this Standard urges e.ich jur isd iction to ensure tl-i -.1 t qua.Ii ty lega l 
representation is provided to indigent capital de fe ndant s :n all ~tages o f the ir 
cases. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Powell v. Alabama, 237 U.S. 45, 68-69; 53 S. Ct. 55; 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932). 
2. See, ~ Marshall, Re:-n.ir ks on the Death Penalty v\ade At the Judicial 
Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 Columbia L. Rev. l ( 1986); Hengstler, 
Attorneys for the Damned, ABA J. 56, 57-59 (January 1, 1987). 
3. For example, counsel should obtain an evaluation of the client by a 
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, 
psychiatrist and/or psychologist "for an expert account of who the defendant is and 
why he or she does what he (or she) does," Dept. of Public Advocacy, KENT UCKY 
PUBLIC ADVOCATE DEATH PENAL TY .\.1ANUAL (3d ed.) pg. 287. Counsel must 
be able to properly prepare the defendant and the expert for the examination and 
to correctly evaluate the strategic impact of the resulting expert opinion, whether 
or not the expert actually testifies. 
4. See Bullington v. ~issouri, 451 U.S. 430; 438-446; 101 S. Ct. 1852; 68 L. 
Ed. 2d 270 (1981). 
5. Balske, The Penalty Phase Trial: A Practical Guide, The Champion, 
(March, 1984) pg. 40, reprinted in California Attorneys for Criminal Justice and 
California Public Defenders Association, CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY 
DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. II, pg. H-6 ( 1986). 
6. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604; 98 S. Ct. 2954; 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305; 96 S. Ct. 2973; 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 
(1976). 
7. See generally, Marshal I, supra note 2. 
8. Jones v. Thigpen, 555 F. Supp. 370, 373-79 (S.D. \fos. 1983), :nodified 741 
F .2d 805 (5th Cir. 1984). 
9. King v. Strickland, 748 F.2nd 1462, 1464 (l l th Cir. 1984), ~- denied, 105 
S. Ct. 2020 (1985). The 11th Circuit held this behavior ineffective assistance of 
counsel under the test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668; 104 S. Ct. 2052; 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 
10. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2nd 1459 (11th Cir. 1983), ~- denied 464 U.S. 
1003; 104 S. Ct • .510 (1983), discussed in Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The 
Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980's, XIV N.Y.U. 
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 797, 840 (1986). The defendant's wife was convicted for the 
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same offense. The same jury issue was raised on her behalf at initial post 
conviction proceedings and was ultimately successful, id. 
11. People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 613 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 
(1980), £fil.· denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981). See also, Note, Effective Assistance of 
Counsel in Capital Cases, 58 N. Y .U. L. Rev. 299, 303 (1983), wherein the author 
compares Jackson with a factually similar California case in which the jury spared 
the defendant's life, and concludes that the dif fer~nce in results depended upon the 
performance of counsel, particularly a t the penalty phase of the trial. 
12. Mitchell v. Kemp,_ U.S.__; 107 S. Ct. 3248; 97 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1987); 
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denia l of certiorar i). 
13. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 197 n. 13 (Wyo. 1981), (Rose, C.J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
14. For a more complete listing of cases in which counsel apparently failed 
to put on a meaningful penalty trial, see, Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel in 
Capital Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, n.151 (1983). 
15. See Str ickland v. Washington, supra note 9; Cronic v. United States, 466 
U.S. 648; 104 S. Ct. 2039; 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). 
16. See Tabak, The Death of Fairness, supra note l0 , .:it 311. 
17. See, Engle v. lssac, 456 U.S. 107; 102 S. Ct. l553; 71 L Ed. 2d 33 (1932); 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72; 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 591. (1977); see also, 
Catz, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: '.\leed for a Preclusion 
Doctrine Exception, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1177, 1180 (1985). 
18. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critigue of the Supreme Court's Recent 
Retreat From Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 737, 779 (1985). 
19. See, Tabakj, The Death of Fairness, supra note 10, at 329-830. 
20. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387; 105 S. Ct 830; 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985). 
- 9 -
21. See e.g. Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEA TH PENAL TY 
DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. III, pg. 8-4 through 8-5 ( 1985). 
22. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.__; 107 S. Ct. l 990; 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 
(1987). In Giarratano v. \1urray, _ F. 2d _ (/187-7518, 6/3/88), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit en bane, affirmed the finding of the district court 
that death row inmates in Virginia are entitled to counsel in state post conviction 
proceedings. However, both the district court and Fourth Circuit opinions are 
based on the Fourteenth Amendment right of inmates to meaningful access to the 
courts as enunciated in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). The district court 
and the Fourth Circuit chose to ignore the Sixth Amendment claims raised by 
Giarratano. 
23. Tabak, The Death of Fairness, supra note 10, at 830-831; See also, 
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent 
Defendants, Bar Information Program (prepared by The Spangenberg Group), 
Caseload and Cost Projections for Federal Habeas Corpus Death Penalty Cases in 
FY 1988 and FY 1989 (1987), Introduction, quoting Judge Godbold of the Eleventh 
Circuit: 
"ls this review for constitutional error meaningful" It is. Of the death 
penalty cases receiving federal court review in this circuit, error of constitutional 
dimension is found in over half the cases." 
24. Tabak, The Death of Fairness, supra note 10, at 835. See also, Elvin, 
Where Are the Lawyers?, Journal of the National Prison Project, pg. 3, Summer 
1987, quoting testimony of capital attorney Jack Boger in the district court 
proceedings in Giarratano, supra: "A complete knowledge of federal constitutional 
criminal procedure law and state substantive criminal law is rudimentary for post 
conviction counsel (including) • • • federal habeas corpus procedural law, which is 
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complicated by doctrines of law unique to those proceedings •.. " (//85-0655-R, 
E.D. Va. Dec. 1986). 
See also, American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defendants, Bar Information Program (prepared by The Spangenberg 
Group), Time & Expense Analysis in Post Conviction Death Penalty Cases 
(February, 1987) pg. 22, quoted in part in Criminal Justice Newsletter, Vol. 18, /110, 
pg. 4 (May 15, 1987). One attorney responding to the questionnaire used in that 
study said: 
"I have been involved, both as plaintiff's counsel and defense counsel, in major, 
protracted litigation of several different types, particularly civil rights litigation. 
No case I have ever handled compares in complexity with my Florida death penalty 
case. The death penalty j:.Jrisprudence is unintelligible; it is inconsistent and, at 
times, irrational. In addition, it is evolving. It constantly changes. In short, there 
is nothing more difficult, rnore time consuming, rnore expensive, and more 
emotionally exhausting than handling a death penalty case after conviction." 
2.5. Fla. Stat. Ann. 27.701 et ~ establishing the Office of the Capital 
Collateral Representative. 
26. Tabak, The Death of Fairness, supra note 10, at 33/J. 
27. The call for quality representation in capital c .:ises is consistent with 
national standards which reject the ad hoc Qr informal assignment of criminal cases 
because that method frequently results in inexperienced counsel and overall lack of 
quality control. See American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal Justice 
(hereinafter ASA Standards), Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.1; NLADA, 
National Study Commission on Defense Services, Guidelines for Legal Defense 
Systems, 2.3; NLAOA, Standards for Defender Services, l.2(b); National Advisory 
Commission, Courts 13 • .5. 
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28. Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 356 (1983). 
29. Lockett, supra note 6, 438 U.S. at 605. 
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STANDARD 2.1 NUMBER OF ATTORNEYS PER CASE 
In cases where the death penalty is sought, two quail fied trial attorneys 
should be assigned to represent the defendant. In cases where the death penalty 
has been imposed, two qualified appellate attorneys should be assigned to represent 
the defendant. In cases where appellate proceedings have been completed or are 
not available and the death penalty has been imposed, two qualified post conviction 
attorneys should be assigned to represent the defendant. 
Commentary: 
The appointment of two attorneys as trial counsel is designed to improve 
representation of indigent capital defendants and is consistent with the position 
adopted by the American Bar Associationl as well as several states.£ 
As discussed in Standard l.l and accompanying commentary, the defendant is 
constitutionally enti tied to legal assistance of sufficient quality so as to prepare an 
adequate defense at trial and an adequate appeal. In the context of capital 
litigation, this mandate is difficult to fulfill where the heavy responsibilities of 
representation are placed in the hands of a single attorney. 
As described in the commentary to Standard 1.1 and in the performance 
Standards of section ll, counsel must be an advocate f0r life as well as a defensive 
tactician. Trial counsel must: obtain the investigative resources necessary to 
prepare thoroughly for both the guilt and penalty phases of trial, Standards 8.1; 
11.4.1; and 11.,J (b) (9); conduct extensive research in search of precedent helpful to 
the client; conduct thorough crime and life-history investigations in preparation for 
both phases of trial, Standard ll.4.1; integrate the defense theory and strategy used 
during the guilt phase with the projected affirmative case for life at the penalty 
phase, Standard 11.7.1; prepare witnesses for both phases of trial; and present all 
reasonably available mitigating evidence helpful to the defendant for the purpose 
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of convincing the judge or jury not to impose a sentence of death, Standard 11.8. 
Preparation for the penalty phase, as well as the adjudication phase, :nust begin 
immediately after counsel has been appointed to represent the defendant. 
Because many of the duties of defense counsel in capital cases are definably 
different from those performed by counsel in criminal cases generally, because 
there are many rapid developments in the complex body of law affecting death 
penalty cases, and especially ')ecause of the harsh and irrevocable nature of the 
potential penalty, the responsibilities of trial counsel are sufficiently onerous to 
require the appointment of two attorneys as trial counsel in order to ensure that 
the capital defendant receives the best possible representation. The appointment 
of co-counsel at trial is not only meant to provide lead counsel with assistance in 
the preparation of both trial and penalty phases of the case, but also to provide 
lead counsel with different perspectives on the issues inherent in each stage of the 
proceedings. The collegial atmosphere of a given defender office should not be 
viewed as a substitute for for:-nal designation of at least two attorneys (within the 
office) as counsel in a capital c.:ise. 
Similarly, the need to provide effective assist:ince of counsel on appeal 
requires the appointment of two competent appellate attorne ys. The quality of 
appellate representation provided capital defendants is often in jeopardy where 
essential duties are borne by a single lawyer. Appellate work in a capital case is 
ti me-consuming and difficult: 
••• a typical death penalty appeal has a record of 5,000 
pages and requires an expenditure of approximately 800-
900 hours of attorney time over a two to three year 
period. A companion habeas corpus petition can add 
another 50 to 200 hours. The opening brief in a capital 
appeal can run to 200 pages, or more, and raise a wide 
variety of guilt and penalty issues. In contrast, the 
typical non-capital appeal or writ in which the Supreme 
Court grants hearing involves a much shorter record and 
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focuses on !ewer issues. Attorneys with less appellate 
experience, or with less time available to devote to a 
case, may therefore wish to seek ap~ointment in a non-
capital appeal or writ instead of a cap1 tal appeall. 
Substantive work must often be done simultaneously with motions to stay the 
execution, etc., ~ Standard 11.9.4, 11.9.5. Two attorneys, whether within an 
appellate defender office or appointed by the court, are required. 
While provision of post conviction counsel to death-sentenced indigent 
defendants is not yet viewed as a Federal Constitutional requirement,i it is 
essential. The judiciary and the bar are recognizing this practical reality in 
jurisdictions across the country. See commentary to Standard 1.1. 
Representing a death-sentenced client in post conviction proceedings is as 
demanding as -- or, if that is possible, even more demanding than -- the tasks faced 
by other capital counsel. Especially when a death warrant has been signed, counsel 
is subjected to demands virtually impossible to meet physically, economically, 
temporally and emotionally. Seeking to ward off imminent execution while 
continuing to challenge the validity of the client's conviction and sentence may 
require filing pleadings almost simultaneously in several courts (.::>ften some 
distance apart). Investigation of factual issues rnay be necessary, and consultation 
with the client will require counsel's time and presence at yet another location) 
Two attorneys should be provided at this stage.§. 
Pursuant to the qualification requirements specified i:1 Standard 5. t, one of 
the two attorneys at each stage should be designated and act as the lead counsel, 
and the other should be designated the co-counsel. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. ASA Criminal Justice Section Wins Approval for Two Resolutions, 36 
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2427 (March 6,1985). 
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2. §.:&, 111. Rev. Stat. Ch. ll0A Sec. 607 (1978); N.C. Supreme Court Rules 
Article IV 4.9(a)(1986); Rule 6.5, Qualifications for Ellgibillty to be Court-
Appointed Counsel for Indigent Capital Defendants in the Courts of Ohio, adopted 
by the Ohio Supreme Court on October 14, 1987. 
3. This statement is made by Michael G. Millman, Executive Director of the 
California Appellate Project (CAP), in a standard letter sent to attorneys who are 
inquiring about appointments from the California Supreme Court in indigent 
criminal appeals. CAP is a non-profit corporation which assists the court in 
making appointments of counsel, and works with counsel -- particularly on death 
penalty appeals -- to assist in providing the requisite high quality of representation. 
4. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.__; 107 S. Ct. 1990; 9.5 L. Ed. 2d .539 
(1987). 
5. See e.g., American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defendants, Bar Information Program (prepared by The Spangenberg 
Group), Time &: Expense Analysis in Post Conviction Death Penalty Cases 
(February, 1937) pg. 21-26. 
6. ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Bar 
Information Program (prepared by The Spangenberg Group), Caseload and Cost 
Projections for Federal Habeas Corpus Death Penalty Cases in FY 1988 and FY 
1989 (1937) pg. 74. 
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STANDARD 3.1 THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION PLAN 
The legal representation plan for each jurisdiction should include measures to 
formalize the process by which attorneys are assigned to represent capital 
defendants. To accomplish this goal, the plan should designate a body (appointing 
authority) within the jurisdiction which will be responsible for performing all duties 
in connection with the appointment of counsel as set forth by these Standards. 
This Standard envisions two equally acceptable approaches for formalizing the 
process of appointment: 
(a) The authority to recruit and select competent attorneys to provide 
representation in capital cases may be centralized in the defender office or 
assigned counsel program of the jurisdiction. The defender office or assigned 
counsel program should adopt standards and procedures for the appointment of 
counsel in capital cases consistent with these Standards, and perform all duties in 
connection with the appointment process as set forth in these Standards. 
(b) In jurisdictions where it is not feasible to centralize the tasks of 
recruiting and selecting competent counsel for capital cases in a defender office or 
assigned counsel program, the legal representation plan should ;xovide for a special 
appointments committee to consist of no fewer than fr,e .it t0rneys who: 
( i) are members of the bar admitted to ?ractice in the 
jurisdiction; 
(ii) have practiced law in the field of criminal defense for 
not less than five years; 
(iii) have demonstnted knowledge of the specialized nature 
of practice involved in capital cases; 
(iv) are knowledgeable about crim inal defense practitioners 
in the jurisdiction; and 
( v) are dedicated to quality legal representation in capital 
cases. 
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The committee should adopt standards and procedures for the appointment of 
counsel in capital cases, consistent with these Standards, and perform all duties in 
connection with the appointment process. 
Commentary: 
Each jurisdiction should take effective measures to formalize the process by 
which attorneys are assigned to represent capital defendants. This Standard 
provides two approaches for accomplishing this gQal. The appropriateness of either 
approach depends in large part upon the nature of the legal representation plan for 
each jurisdiction. 
For example, this Standard acknowledges that effective procedures for the 
recruitment, appointment, and monitoring of qualified attorneys in capital cases 
are already in place in some defender of fices and assigned counsel programs or 
could be developed and implemented within these programs. Assuming these pre-
existing or newly developed procedures are sufficient to ensure the appointment of 
quail fied attorneys in capital cases, this Standard -- in jurisdictions where the 
appointment function is centralized in a defender office or assigned counsel 
program -- does not call for the establishment of a special committee as described 
in subsection (b). This Standard emphasizes, however, that defender 0ffices and 
assigned counsel programs entrusted with the task of :i.ss igning qualified counsel in 
capital cases should perform their duties in a manner c0nsistent with these 
Standards, particularly as regards the application of attorney eligibility criteria. 
See Standard 5.1. 
This Standard also acknowledges those jurisdictions where it is not feasible or 
possible to centralize in a defender office or assigned counsel program the tasks of 
recruiting and selecting qualified attorneys in capital cases. The legal 
representation plan for these jurisdictions should include measures to centralize 
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the authority to make such assignments in a committee composed of knowledgeable 
attorneys, who should devise standards and procedures for the provision of counsel 
as well as perform duties relating to the administration of the assignment system. 
These administrative tasks include: the esta!)lishment of performance standards, 
Standards 11.1 and 11.2; the collection of names of qualified members of the bar and 
the assignment of qualified attorneys to individual cases, Standards 4.1 and 5.1; 
the monitoring of attorney performance and workload, Standards 6.1 and 7.1; the 
acquisition of adequate resources for support services and the provision of training 
programs, Standards 8.1 and 9.1; and the approval of compensation vouchers 
submitted by appointed lawyers, Standard 10.1. 
An important function of the committee is to exercise general supervision 
over the administration of a program composed of lawyers performing professional 
work.l Accordingly, the members of the committee should also be members of the 
bar, since this tends "to assure a response to the needs and problems of the 
program grounded in an understanding of the lawyer's professional function and 
responsibility."£ Similarly, because of the unique specialization of criminal 
defense practice involved in capital litigation, it is desirable for all of the attorney 
committee members to have not only a general background in -: rim inal defense, but 
also a working knowledge of the issues involved in litigating a death penalty case. 
Possession of such knowledge has the additional advantage of enabling committee 
members, if requested by appointed counsel, to provide advice on the handling of 
specific cases, as well as provide information concerning recent criminal law and 
procedure developments, written materials on criminal defense, and appropriate 
. . 3 training programs.-
An effective · means of securing professional independence for assigned 
counsel is to place responsibility for the decisions concerning the assignment of 
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counsel in a committee whose members are themselves free from conflicts-of-
interest or partisanship and are able to act in an objective fashion as dictated by 
their best professional judgment.:t. Consequently, the membership of the committee 
on appointments should not include prosecutors or judges. This restriction is 
necessary in order to: 
remove any implication that defense attorneys under the 
system are subject to the control of those who appear as 
their adversaries or before whom they must appear in the 
representation of defendants, except as judges are 
charged with the disciplinary supervision of all members 
of the bar.1. 
In order to preserve the integrity of the committee and the appointments 
process, a lawyer should never be assigned for reasons personal to the committee 
members making assignments,~ Standard ~. l. However, because most assignments 
in capital cases are to local counsel, it is desirable for committee members to be 
familiar with criminal lawyers practicing in the jurisdiction,Z in order to make 
more informed decisions regarding an attorney's ab iii ty to provide quality 
representation. Courtroom observation of a particular attorney, for example, may 
assist committee members in assessing the attorney's eligibility to represent 
capital clients pursuant to Standard 5 .1. 
Where assignment by the court is made to a defender off ice, the office must 
ensure that the individual attorneys designated to handle capital cases are qualified 
under Standard 5.1 and that the other Standards are adhered to. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. See, ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-1.3 
commentary. 
2. Id. 
3. See, ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.1 
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commentary. 
4. See, ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-1.3 
commentary. 
5. Id. See also, California Standing Committee on Delivery of Legal Services 
to Criminal Defendants, Report on the Independence of the Criminal Defense Bar 
and Standards Relating to Professional Competence of Appointed Counsel, 3-4 
(1980). 
6. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2. l. 
7. See, North Carolina Supreme Court Rules, Article IV 4.2(c) (1980). 
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STANDARD 4.1 SELECTION OF COUNSEL 
(a) The legal representation plan should provide for a systematic and 
publicized method for distributing assignments in capital cases as widely as 
possible among qualified members of the bar. 
(b) The appointing authority should develop procedures to be used in 
establishing two rosters of attorneys who are competent and available to represent 
indigent capital defendants. The first roster shouid contain the names of attorneys 
eligible for appointment as lead defense counsel for trial, appeal or post conviction 
pursuant to the qualification requirements specified in Standard 5.1; the second 
roster should contain the names of attorneys eligible for appointment as co-counsel 
for trial, appeal or post conviction pursuant to the qualification requirements 
specified in the same Standard. 
(c) The appointing authority should review applications from attorneys 
concerning their placement on the roster of eligible attorneys from which 
assignments are made, as discussed in subsection (b). The review of an application 
should include a thorough investigation of the attorney's background, experience, 
and training, and an assessment of whether the attorney is c0,npetent to provide 
quality legal representation to the client pursuant to the qua.ii fica tion requirements 
specified in Standard 5.1 and the performance standards established pursuant to 
Standards 11.1 and 11.2. An attorney's name should be placed on either roster upon a 
majority vote of the committee. 
(d) Assignments should then be made in the sequence that the names appear 
on the roster of eligible attorneys. Departures from the practice of strict rotation 
of assignments may be made when such departure will protect the best interests of 
the client. A lawyer should never be assigned for reasons personal to the 
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committee members making assignments. 
(e) In jurisdictions where a defender office or other entity by law receives a 
specific portion of or all assignments, the procedures in (b) through (d) above should 
be followed for cases which the defender office or other entity cannot accept due 
to conflicts of interest or other reasons. 
Commentary: 
The importance of systematically assigning counsel in capital cases has been 
previously noted in the commentaries to Standards 1.1 and 3.1. Once the legal 
representation plan has been developed, the procedures for distributing assignments 
should be placed in writing and be publicized. Publicity is necessary to: 
dispel doubts concerning the method by which defense of 
the accused is being achieved and fosters scrutiny of the 
plan by the bar and public..!. 
Publication of the terms of the plan: 
ensures that the bar is aware of the process by which 
counsel is being provided and promotes public confidence 
in the defender and assigned counsel programs, which is 
essential if they are to be financed adequately and 
operate effective! yd 
Moreover, since the overall goal of the legal representation plan should be to 
ensure the presence of sufficient numbers of attorneys capable of prov iding 
competent legal services to capital client s, the terms of the plan should be 
publicized in a manner which attracts participation from the largest possible 
number of qualified criminal practitioners in the jurisdiction.1 · 
The appointing authority is charged with the task of assessing the 
qualifications of attorneys who wish to represent capital defendants. Consistent 
with Standard 2.1, two qualified attorneys should be assigned to each case, one 
designated as the lead defense counsel and the other as co-counsel. 
It should be the responsibility of the appointing authority to devise separate 
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lists of attorneys who are able and willing to provide such services. A meaningful 
review of each request for inclusion on the lists should include a careful matching 
of the attorney's qualifications with the eligibility criteria listed in Standard 5.1. 
In order to make informed decisions on eligibility, the appointing authority should 
have sufficient flexibility to gather as much relevant information as possible to 
secure a fair picture of the applicant's ability and experience. The committee 
should utilize whatever sources of information it deems appropriate, including 
contact with the applicant, with judges before whom the applicant has appeared, 
with others who are familiar with the applicant's professional abilities, in-court 
observations, writing samples and the like. 
Reference should be made to the performance standards established pursuant 
to Standards 11.1 and 11.2 when evaluating information received as to the prior 
performance in a capital case of attorneys seeking to establish eligibility for 
placement on the roster. The review process should be conducted pursuant to 
Standard 5.1 on attorney eligibility in order to ensure that appointments will be 
made on the basis of ability and not upon unrelated factors. 
Simplicity and fairness in the allocation of cases to eligible attorneys are 
ensured by automatically rotating the names on each roster with limited exceptions 
for cause. This Standard's rotation scheme parallels those recommended in other 
national standards relating to defense services. The ABA's Standards for Providing 
Defense Services state that "(o)rdinarily, assignments should be made in the 
sequence that the names appear on the roster of eligible lawyers'' in order "to avoid 
patronage and its appearance, and to ensure fair distribution of assignments among 
all whose names appear on the roster of eligible lawyers.11.i A similar view is 
expressed by the National Study Commission on Defense Services: "Although 
methods of assigning cases may vary with local procedures and conditions, the 
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administrator, in designing the systems and making assignments, should (distribute 
cases) in an equitable way among the panel members to ensure balanced workloads 
through a rotating system with allowances for variance when necessary ."1 
Consistent with these recommendations, Standard 4,.1 states that exceptions 
to strict rotation should be limited to instances where departure would serve the 
best interests of the client. 
Three of these exceptions bear special mention. Where the rotational 
appointment of a designated lawyer is impossible due to a conflict of interest, the 
assignment should be distributed to the next eligible lawyer on the list..2. A second 
exception should allow consideration of a defendant's preference for a particular 
attorney. While it is true that the indigent defendant does not enjoy the right to 
select the private lawyer of his choice,I "there is much to be said for allowing the 
(indigent) defendant, when administratively feasible, the same freedom of action 
available to the defendant of means."~ Where the desired attorney is otherwise 
willing and eligible to accept the assignment, there is no reason not to 
accommodate the defendant's choice when possible.2. A third exception should 
permit deviation from the established sequence where the nature of the charges or 
other circumstances require the appointment of a lawyer possessing special 
l.f. . . h 10 qua 1 1cat1ons to serve m t e case.-
If applicable law provides that a defender office or other entity is to be 
assigned to a given portion of all indigent capital defendants, the rotation system 
should be followed to the extent possible. For example, if a defender office 
receives half of all assignments, the office name could alternate on the list with 
other eligible counsel. The rotation system should be used for all cases which the 
defender office or other entity cannot accept, subject to the caveats set out above. 
FOOTNOTES: 
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1. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.1 commentary. 
2. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-1.2 commentary. 
3. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.2 commentary; 
see also, ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-1.5 commentary. 
4. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.3; see also, ABA 
Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.l. 
5. NLADA, National Study Commission on Defense Services, Guidelines for 
Legal Defense Systems, 2.16 (1976). 
6. See, ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.3 
commentary. 
7. Trial judges have absolute discretion in deciding whether to grant the 
request of an indigent defendant for a particular lawyer.£.:&. Drumgo v. Superior 
Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930,506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. (1973). 
8. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.3 commentary. 
9. See NLADA, National Study Commission on Defense Services, Guidelines 
for Legal Defense Systems, 5.12 (1976). 
l O. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.3. 
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STANDARD 5.1 ATTORNEY ELIGIBILITY 
The appointing authority should distribute assignments in capital cases to 
attorneys who possess the following quail flea tions: 
I. TRIAL 
A. Lead trial counsel assignments should be distributed to attorneys who: 
(i} are members of the bar admitted to practice in the 
jurisdiction or admitted to practice pro hac vice; and 
(ii) are experienced and active tr ial practitioners with at 
least five years lit igation experience in the field of 
cr iminal defense; and 
(iii) have prior experience as lead counsel in no fewer than 
nine jury tr ials of ser ious and complex cases which were 
tried to completion, as well as prior experience as lead 
counsel or co-counsel in at least one case in which the 
death penalty was sought. In addition, of the nine jury 
trials which were tried to completion, the attorney should 
have been lead counsel in at least three cases in which the 
charge was murder or aggravated murder; or 
alternatively, of the nine jury trials, at least one was a 
murder or aggravated murder trial and an additional five 
were felony jury trials; and 
(iv) are familiar with the practice and procedure of the 
criminal courts of the jur isdiction; and 
(v) are familiar with and experienced in the utilization of 
expert witnesses and evidence, including, but not lim ited 
to, psychiatric and forensic evidence; and 
(v i) have attended and successfully completed, with in one 
year of their appointment, a training or educat ional 
program on criminal advocacy which focused on the trial 
of cases in which the death penalty is sought; and 
(vii) have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and 
commitment which exemplify the quality of 
representation appropriate to capital cases. 
B. Trial co-counsel assignments should be distributed to attorneys who: 
(i) are members of the bar admitted to practice in the 
jurisdiction or admitted to practice pro hac vice; and 
(ii) who qualify as lead counsel under paragraph (A) of this 
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Standard or meet the following requirements: 
(a) are experienced and active trial 
practitioners with at least three years 
litigation experience in the field of 
criminal defense; and 
(b) have prior experience as lead counsel 
or co-counsel in no fewer than three 
jury trials of serious and complex 
cases which were tried to completion, 
at least two of which were trials in 
which the charge was murder or 
aggravated murder; or alternatively, 
of the three jury trials, at least one 
was a murder or aggravated murder 
trial and one was a felony jury trial; 
and 
(c) are familiar with the practice and 
procedure of the criminal courts of 
the jurisdiction; and 
(d) have completed within one year of 
their appointment at least one training 
or educational program on criminal 
advocacy which focused on the trial of 
cases in which the death penalty is 
sought; and 
(e) have demonstrated the necessary 
proficiency and commitment which 
exemplify the quality of 
representation appropriate to capita! 
cases. 
C. Alternate Procedures: Appointments for lead and co-counsel 
assignments may also be distributed to persons with extensive criminal trial 
experience or extensive civil litigation experience, if it is clearly demonstrated to 
the appointing authority that competent representation will be provided to the 
capitally charged indigent defendant. Lawyers appointed under this paragraph shall 
meet one or more of the following qualifications: 
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(i) Experience in the trial of death penalty cases which does 
not meet the levels detailed in paragraphs A or B above; 
(ii) Specialized post-graduate training in the defense of 
persons accused of capital crimes; 
(iii) The availability of ongoing consultation support from 
experienced death penalty counsel. 
Attorneys appointed under this paragraph should be prescreened by a 
panel of experienced death penalty attorneys (see Standard 3.1) to ensure that they 
will provide competent representation. 
II. APPEAL 
who: 
A. Lead appellate counsel assignments should be distributed to attorneys 
(i) are members of the bar admitted to practice in the 
jurisdiction or admitted to practice pro hac vice; and 
(ii) are experienced and active trial or appellate practitioners 
with at least three years experience in the field of 
criminal defense; and 
(iii) have prior experience within the last three years as lead 
counsel or co-counsel in the appeal of at least one case 
where a sentence of death was imposed, as well as prior 
experience within the last three years as lead counsel in 
the appeal of no fewer than three felony convictions in 
federal or state court, at least one of which was an appeal 
of murder or aggravated murder conviction; or 
alternatively, have prior experience within the last three 
years as lead counsel in the appeal of no fewer than six 
felony convictions in federal or state court, at least two 
of which were appeals of a murder or aggravated murder 
conviction; and 
(iv) are familiar with the practice and procedure of the 
appellate courts of the jurisdiction; and 
(v) have attended and successfully completed, within one 
year prior to their appointment, a training or educational 
program on criminal advocacy which focused on the 
appeal of cases in which a sentence of death was imposed; 
and 
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(vi) have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and 
commitment which exemplify the quality of 
representation appropriate to capital cases. 
B. Appellate co-counsel assignments may be distributed to attorneys who 
have less experience than attorneys who qualify as lead appellate counsel. At a 
minimum, however, assistant appellate attorney candidates must demonstrate to 
the satisfaction of the appointing authority that they: 
(i) are members of the bar admitted to practice in the 
jurisdiction or admitted to practice pro hac vice; and 
(ii) have demonstrated adequate proficiency in appellate 
advocacy in the field of felony defense; and 
(iii) are familiar with the practice and procedure of the 
appellate courts of the jurisdiction; and 
(iv) have attended and successfully completed within two 
years of their appointment a training or educational 
program on criminal appellate advocacy. 
C. Alternate Procedures: Appointments for lead and co-counsel assignments 
may also be distributed to persons with extensive criminal trial and/or appellate 
experience or extensive civil litigation and/or appellate experience, if it is clearly 
demonstrated to the appointing authority that competent representation will be 
provided to the capitally charged indigent defendant. Lawyers appointed under this 
paragraph shall meet one or more of the following qualifications: 
(i) Experience in the trial and/or appeal of death penalty 
cases which does not meet the levels detailed in 
paragraphs A or B above; 
(ii) Specialized post-graduate training in the defense of 
persons accused of capital crimes; 
(iii) The availability of ongoing consultation support from 
experienced death penalty counsel. 
Attorneys appointed under this paragraph should be pre screened by a 
panel of experienced death penalty attorneys (see Standard 3.1) to ensure that they 
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will provide competent representation. 
III. POST CONVICTION 
Assignments to represent indigents in post conviction proceedings in capital 
cases should be distributed to attorneys who: 
(i) are members of the bar admitted to practice in the 
jurisdiction or admitted to practice pro hac vice; and 
(ii) are experienced and active trial practitioners with at 
least three years litigation experience in the field of 
criminal defense; and 
(iii) have prior experience as counsel in no fewer than five 
jury or bench trials of serious and complex cases which 
were tried to completion, as well as prior experience as 
post conviction counsel in at least three cases in state or 
federal court. In addition, of t he five jury or bench trials 
which were tried to completion, the attorney should have 
been counsel in at least three cases in which the charge 
was murder or aggravated murder; or alternatively, of the 
five trials, at least one was a murder or aggravated 
murder trial and an additional three were felony jury 
trials; and 
(iv) are familiar with the practice and procedure of the 
appropriate courts of the jurisdiction; and 
(v) have attended and successfully completed, within one 
year prior to their appointment, a training or educational 
program on criminal advocacy which focused on the post 
conviction phase of a crimina l case, or alternatively, a 
program which focused on the trial of cases in which the 
death penalty is sought; and 
(v i) have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and 
commitment which exemplify the quality of 
representation appropriate to capital cases. 
In addition to the experience level detailed above, it is desirable that at least one 
of the two post conviction counsel also possesses appellate experience at the level 
described in 11.B. above (relating to appellate co-counsel). 
B. Alternate Procedures: Appointments for lead and co-counsel assignments 
may also be distributed to persons with extensive criminal trial, appellate and/or 
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post conviction experience or extensive civil litigation and/or appellate 
experience, if it is clearly demonstrated to the appointing authority that 
competent representation will be provided to the capitally charged indigent 
defendant. Lawyers appointed under this paragraph shall meet one or more of the 
following qualifications: 
(i) Experience in trial, appeal and/or post conviction 
representation in death penalty cases which does not meet 
the levels detailed in paragraph A above; 
(ii) Specialized post-graduate training in the defense of 
persons accused of capital crimes; 
(iii) The availability of ongoing consultation support from 
experienced death penalty counsel. 
Attorneys appointed under this paragraph should be pre screened by a panel of 
experienced death penalty attorneys (see Standard 3.1) to ensure that they will 
provide competent representation. 
Commentary: 
Eligibility requirements for capital counsel are aimed at providing highly 
qualified and dedicated attorneys to defendants who face the most serious of 
consequences -- death. Consequently, the appointing authority should adopt 
eligibility standards which reflect at least seven essential quality control criteria 
necessary for the selection of able counsel at all levels in capital cases: (i) license 
or permission to practice in the jurisdiction; (ii) general background in criminal 
defense work; (iii) demonstrated experience in felony practice at the appropriate 
level (trial, appeals, post conviction); (iv) demonstrated experience in death penalty 
litigation; (v) familiarity with the requisite court system(s); (vi) significant and 
continuous training in death penalty litigation; and (vii) demonstrated proficiency 
and commitment to quality representation. Additionally, eligibility standards 
should require trial counsel to have demonstrated experience with expert witnesses 
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and evidence. Drafters of local eligibility standards are encouraged to consider 
additional criteria which will enhance the quality of representation provided. See 
Standard 11.1 ~ seq. and accompanying commentary. Once the standards have 
been developed, the objective of effective representation requires consistent and 
continuous application of the quality control criteria in order to ensure that 
defendants facing the prospect of death are not receiving inadequate 
representation. 
The importance of distributing assignments to experienced attorneys 
possessing a substantial background in criminal defense practice has been 
previously noted. See commentaries to Standards 1.1, 2.1, and to the performance 
Standards in section 11. As in all criminal cases, it is elemental that assigned 
counsel be familiar with the practice and procedure of the courts where the client's 
case will be heard.l 
As discussed in Standards 1. 1, 11.4. l., 11.7 .2 and 11.8, verdicts and 
sentencing decisions in capital cases often turn upon the submission by both the 
prosecution and defense of evidence from expert witnesses. Eligible trial attorneys 
should therefore be adept at using expert evidence to the advantage of the client, 
and at cross-examining prosecution witnesses. 
All assigned counsel should be required to receive relevant training on a 
periodic basis in order to enhance their advocacy skills; the changing nature of 
capital jurisprudenc~ requires capital counsel to keep abreast of constantly 
changing legal developments relating to death penalty matters. At all levels of 
capital representation, counsel should have the necessary skill and knowledge to 
provide quality representation. 
This Standard recognizes that fulfillment of the experiential criteria or its 
equivalent is a necessary, but not a sufficient, prerequisite for attorney eligibility. 
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There may be instances where an attorney's background objectively satisfies the 
experiential criteria, but his or her past performance did not represent the level of 
proficiency or commitment necessary for the adequate representation of a client in 
a capital case. Such an attorney should be excluded from the roster list. 
Consequently, before placing an attorney's name on a roster list, the appointing 
authority should make an initial determination regarding the attorney's ability to 
satisfy the experiential criteria. The appointing authority should then make a 
second determination that the attorney's past performance exemplifies the quality 
of representation appropriate to capital cases, utilizing the Standards established 
by the authority pursuant to Standard 11.1. The application of this two-pronged 
eligibility test will help prevent the mechanical assignment of cases to 
experientially qualified attorneys who have not demonstrated the requisite skill, 
dedication, or commitment necessary for capital cases. 
This Standard acknowledges that there are many attorneys who do not possess 
the experiential criteria detailed in the Standard, but who should receive 
appointments because they will provide competent representation at trial, appeal 
and/or post conviction. Such attorneys may have criminal law experience which 
does not meet the experiential criteria, may have attended training in death 
penalty defense representation or may have substantial experience in civil 
practice. These attorneys should receive appointments if the appointing authority 
is satisfied the defendant or inmate will be provided with the same quality of 
representation as clients represented by attorneys who met the experiential 
criteria. Attorneys who are appointed under the "Alternate Procedures" clauses of 
this Standard obviously have an obligation to consult with other attorneys who are 
expert in death penalty defense, to attend specialized training and to do whatever 
else is necessary to allow them to provide competent representation to their 
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clients. 
Where the appointment of counsel is to a defender office, the appo inting 
authority may permit both lead and co-counsel to be designated by the office, but 
should determine that these Standards are being used in making that designation. 
The resources and experience of an office as a whole may be considered as 
one factor in determining the qualification of the individual attorneys within that 
office, but cannot substitute for the personal qualifications of the individual 
attorneys actually handing death penalty cases. For example, the resources and 
experience of the office might justify allowing an otherwise qualified attorney 
within that office to act as lead counsel after somewhat less than five years of 
personal litigation experience (Standard 5.1.1.A(ii)) but could not justify allowing an 
attorney within that office to act as death penalty counsel after only minimal 
personal cr iminal litigation experience. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.2 commentary. 
2. See ~ the quote of a capital post conviction attorney describing death 
penalty jurisprudence as "unintelligible," "inconsistent and at times, irrational" as 
well as "evolving ••• constantly chang(ing)." American Bar Assoc iation, Standing 
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Bar Information Program 
(prepared by The Spangenberg Group), Time & Expense Analysis in Post Conviction 
Death Penalty Cases (February, 1987) pg. 22, quoted in part in Criminal Justice 
Newsletter, Vol. 18, /110, pg. 4 (May 15, 1987). 
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STANDARD 6.1 WORKLOAD 
Attorneys accepting appointments pursuant to these Standards should provide 
each client with quality representation in accordance with constitutional and 
professional standards. Capital counsel should not accept workloads which, by 
reason of their excessive size, interfere with the rendering of quality 
representation or lead to the breach of professional obligations. 
Commentary: 
The goal in providing defense services in capital cases should be to ensure 
high quality legal representation to persons unable to afford counsel. See Standard 
1.1. The caseload of an attorney receiving assignments pursuant to these Standards 
should, therefore, permit him or her to provide each client with the time and effort 
necessary to ensure effective representation. As the American Bar Association has 
noted: 
One of the single most important impediments to the 
furnishing of quality defense services for the poor is the 
presence of excessive caseloads. All too often in 
defender organizations, attorneys are asked to provide 
representation in too many cases. Unfortunately, not 
even the most able and industrious lawyers can provide 
quality representation when their workloads are 
unmanageable. Excessive workloads, moreover, lead to 
attorney frustration, disillusionment by clients, and 
weakening of the adversary systemJ. 
Assignments should be distributed in light of each attorney's duties under the 
Code of Professional Responsibility not to accept "employment ••• when he is unable 
to render competent service ••• ".£ or to handle cases "without preparation adequate 
in the circumstances.111 Similarly, counsel -- including defender offices -- should 
be admonished not to accept more assignments than they can reasonably dischargei 
or to accept a client where the representation will be materially limited by the 
attorney's responsibilities to another client or to a third person.2• 
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In accordance with these principles, the appointing authority is urged to 
assess the non-capital workload (including private practice, if any) as well as death 
penalty workloads of eligible attorneys to determine whether the workloads are 
excessive. To assist in assessing workloads, some defender of fices have established 
caseload guidelines which are useful in determining whether the workload of a 
. 1 . . 6 part1cu ar attorney 1s excessive.- These guidelines may be consulted as one 
measure of appropriate workloads. Assignments per attorney should be limited to 
an appropriate level consistent with the lawyer's ability to provide each client with 
quality representation in accordance with constitutional and professional standards. 
This limitation is applicable to defender offices as weJJ as to members of the 
private bar. 
As stated in Standard 4.1, exceptions to the practice of strict rotation of 
assignments should be permitted in instances where departure would serve the best 
interests of the client. This may require that some attorneys receive more 
assignments than other attorneys. The instant Standard, therefore, should not be 
read as requiring identical caseloads among the attorneys who are qualified to 
receive appointments. Where a particular attorney is receiving additional 
assignments, the appointing authority should be especially diligent in ensuring that 
the caseload is consistent with the lawyer's abili ty tu provide quality 
representation to each client. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. ASA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-4.3 commentary. 
2. ASA Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-30; accord, ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3 comment. ''A lawyer's workload 
should be controlled so that each matter can be handled adequately." 
3. ASA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 6-10 l{A)(2). 
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4. ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-1.2(d). 
5. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7(b). The comment to 
that Rule says that "a lawyer's need for income should not lead the lawyer to 
undertake matters that cannot be handled competently •• " See also NLADA, 
Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation (Draft Standard 1.3 
(a)). 
6. In determining maximum effective workloads for its staff attorneys, the 
District of Columbia Public Defender Service considers the following factors: 
quality of representation, speed of turnover of cases, percentage of cases tried, 
extent of support services available to staff attorneys, court procedures, and other 
activities or complex litigation. An Exemplary Project, l Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration. 13-14 ( 1974). 
See, NLADA, National Study Commission on Defense Services, Guidelines for 
Legal Defense Systems, 5.1-5.3; NL ADA, Standards for Defender Services, IV. l; 
National Advisory Commission, Courts, 13.12. These standards all acknowledge the 
need to determine acceptable workloads, and all acknowledge within the standards 
themselves or in commentary the myriad factors that must be considered in 
weighing workload. Only the National Advisory Commission sets forth suggested 
numerical maximums for caseloads; those numbers are prov ided with the caveat 
"that particular local conditions -- such as travel time -- may mean that lower 
limits are essential." The NAC standard does not address death penalty workloads. 
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STANDARD 7.1 MONITORING; REMOVAL 
(a) The appointing authority should monitor the performance of assigned 
counsel to ensure that the client is receiving quality representation. Where there 
is compelling evidence that an attorney has inexcusably ignored basic 
responsibilities of an effective lawyer, resulting in prejudice to the client's case, 
the attorney should not receive additional appointments. Where there is 
compelling evidence that an unalterable sys temic defect in a defender office has 
caused a default in the basic responsibilities of an effective lawyer, resulting in 
prejudice to a client's case, the office should not receive additional appointments. 
The appointing authority shall establish a procedure which gives written notice to 
counsel or a defender office whose removal is being sought, and an opportunity for 
counsel or the defender office to respond in writing. 
(b) In fulfilling its monitoring function, however, the appointing authority 
should not attempt to interfere with the conduct of particular cases. 
Representation of an accused establishes an inviolable attorney-client relationship. 
In the context of a particular case, removal of counsel from representation should 
not occur over the objection of the client. 
(c) No attorney or defender office should be readmitted to the appointment 
roster after removal under (a) above unless such removal is shown to have been 
erroneous or it is established by clear and convincing ev idence that the cause of 
the failure to meet basic responsibilities has been identified and corrected. 
Commentary: 
Consistent with its duty to ensure that quality legal assistance is afforded to 
indigent capital defendants, the appointing authority should make an effort to 
monitor the performance of assigned counsel, including defender offices. 
"Admittedly, this is not an easy task and there obviously are difficulties present in 
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having third parties scrutinize the judgments of private counsel. On the other 
b d h . "l hand, the difficulty of the task should not e an excuse to o not mg. -
While the appointing authority, at a minimum, should investigate and keep 
track of any complaints made against assigned counsel by judges, clients and other 
attorneys l, an effective attorney-monitoring program in the context of life and 
death matters should go considerably beyond these activities. The professional 
performance of each assigned lawyer should be subject to systematic review based 
upon publicized standards (see section 11) and procedures. Removal of an 
attorney's name from the list of attorneys eligible to receive appointments should 
not occur simply because members of the committee on appointments might have 
represented the client differently had they been assigned to the case. Rather, this 
Standard adopts the position that counsel should be removed from the roster of 
eligible attorneys where, in the context of a particular case, counsel's inexcusable 
dereliction of duty has resulted in prejudice to the client's case. This test for 
removal is consistent with Standard 5.1 which precludes assignments to 
experientially qualified attorneys who fail to demonstrate the sufficient skill, 
dedication, and commitment which exemplify the quality of representation 
. . 1 3 appropriate to capita cases.-
In fulfilling its monitoring function, the appointing authority should not 
assume the task of overseeing the content of assigned counsel's work.~ In order to 
preserve the nature of the attorney-client relationship, counsel for the accused 
must have total freedom to represent their clients as they deem professionally 
appropriate. Clients, moreover, should have the right to continue satisfactory 
relationships with their appointed lawyers in whom they have reposed their 
confidence and trust • . Removal of counsel from representation therefore should not 
occur unless the client agrees to a substitute counsel), Where the assigned lawyer 
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is unable to provide effective representation due to a mental or physical 
impairment,i the Court may be forced to intervene, on its own motion or at the 
request of the client (in propria persona or through the appoint ing authority). In 
such cases, the Court's sole objective must be to protect the interests of the client. 
Where cases are assigned to a defender office rather than an individual 
attorney, the appointing authority is not excused from the monitoring function. 
Procedures should be established for preventing a recurrence of any noted 
dereliction of duty. If the defender office administration is acting as the 
appointing authority or is permitted by the appointing authority to designate 
individual attorneys within the office as counsel for the death penalty cases 
assigned to the office, the individual attorneys within the office should be subject 
to removal from eligibility just as private attorneys are. 
Where a dereliction of duty is noted following the appointment of a defender 
office, the appointing authority may act in ways short of removing the office as a 
whole from the appointment roster, if other steps are taken to ensure that there is 
no recurrence of the problem. If an office policy, the office workload, or other 
systemic problem has led to a dereliction of duty and is not corrected, the 
appointing authority should remove the office from the appointment roster. 
Because of the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty, counsel 
who have been removed from the appointment roster should be readmitted only 
upon exceptional assurances that no further dereliction of duty will occur. 
Readmission to the roster should not be granted until the appointing authority 
determines that removal from the roster was improper, or determines by clear and 
convincing evidence that the cause of the dereliction of duty which led to the 
removal has been identified and corrected. Readmission may be conditioned on 
specific actions (e.g. proof of reduction in workload, proof of additional training 
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and/or experience, substance abuse counseling, or correction of systemic defects in 
an office). 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.2 commentary. 
2. See, Id. 
3. The standard for denying additional appointments to death penalty lawyers 
should be more stringent than the standard for denying additional appointments in 
non-capital cases. The standard in non-capital criminal cases is that "where there 
is compelling evidence that an attorney consistently has ignored basic 
responsibilities ••• additional appointments to the panel member ought not be 
made by the assigned-counsel program." ABA Standards, Providing Defense 
Services, Standard 5-2.2 commentary (emphasis added). 
As has been made plain throughout these Standards, the incompetent 
representation of capital defendants may have irrevocable life-or-death 
consequences. Accordingly, the appointing authority should not wait for an 
attorney to "consistently ignore basic responsibilities" or otherwise display a 
pattern of incompetence before denying additional appointments to that attorney. 
t+. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, 5-1.3 commentary; ~ also, 
ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, 5-5.3 and commentary. 
5. Id. 5-5.3. 
6. It cannot always be safely assumed that counsel who has been determined 
to be qualified based on past performance will represent current or future clients 
satisfactorily. Circumstances can change. For example, the attorney may begin 
suffering from illness, chemical dependency or other handicap unknown to the 
appointing authority, the court or the client. A Georgia man was executed despite 
the post conviction discovery that his trial counsel, who had failed to of fer 
- t+2 -
important mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, had been on drugs during the 
trial. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of 
the Death Penalty, XIV N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc. Change 797, 841 (1986), discussing 
Young v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 514 (1 1th Cir. 1985). 
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STANDARD 8.1 SUPPORTING SERVICES 
The legal representation plan for each jurisdiction should provide counsel 
appointed pursuant to these Standards with investigative, expert, and other 
services necessary to prepare and present an adequate defense. These should 
include not only those services and facilities needed for an effective defense at 
trial, but also those that are required for effective defense representation at every 
stage of the proceedings, including the sentencing phase. 
Commentary: 
In a capital case reaffirming that fundamental fairness entitles indigent 
defendants to the "basic tools of an adequate defense,'' the United States Supreme 
Court stated that: 
We recognized long ago that mere access to the 
courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper 
functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal 
trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against 
an indigent defendant without making certain that he has 
access to the raw materials integral to the building of an 
effective defense..!. 
The Court reiterates the proposition adopted by other national standards on 
defense servicesl that quality representation cannot be rendered by assigned 
counsel unless the lawyers have available for their use adequate supporting 
services. These services include: 
.•. expert witnesses capable of testifying at trial and at 
other proceedings, personnel skilled in social work and 
related disciplines to provide assistance at pretrial 
release hearings and at sentencings, and trained 
investigators to interview witnesses and to assemble 
demonstrative evidence. l 
As set out in the following Standards and/or commentary -- 1.1, 11.4.1, 11.5.1, 
11.7.2 and 11.8, experts and other supporting services are frequently vital in 
capital cases. 
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Counsel assigned to represent defendants in capital cases must engage in 
ongoing research in order to keep abreast of the rapidly changing legal 
developments in the complex body of law surrounding death penalty issues. In 
order to make use of sophisticated jury selection techniques (discussed in 
commentaries to Standards 1.1 and 11.7.2), for example, the defense requires access 
to social scientists and other experts who can assist in voir dire questioning and the 
profiling of prospective jurors. Since pretrial investigation and preparation are 
fundamental to attorney competence at trial (Standard 11.4.1 and accompanying 
commentary), assigned counsel requires the services of trial assistants such as 
investigators to gather evidence and witnesses favorable to the client and to enable 
counsel to intelligently assess conflicting options. An adequate defense also 
requires the services of expert witnesses to testify on behalf of the client and to 
prepare defense counsel to effectively cross-examine the state's experts.2-
Additionally, counsel in a capital case is obligated to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the defendant's life history and background and, if it is in the best 
interest of the client, to present mitigating ev idence uncovered during the course 
of that investigation at the penalty phase of the trial (Standard 11.8.6). Counsel , 
whether practicing privately or within a defender office, cannot adequately 
perform these and other crucial penalty phase tasks without the assistance of 
investigators and other assistants. 
It is critical, therefore, for each jurisdiction to authorize sufficient funds to 
enable counsel in capital cases to conduct a thorough investigation for trial, 
sentencing, appeal and post conviction and to procure the necessary expert 
witnesses and documentary evidence.§. Assigned attorneys involved in capital cases 
are typically provided with few, if any, resources to fund this aspect of case 
preparation.Z. According to one source, the funds which states and counties provide 
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for defense counsel are far below the amounts that would be needed even if capital 
trials had only one phase.! Furthermore, funds available to appointed defense 
counsel are substantially below those available to the prosecution.2. This inequity 
is unconscionable. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68; 105 S. Ct. 1087; 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985). 
2. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, 5-1.4; National Advisory 
Commission, Courts, 13.14; NLADA, National Study Commission on Defense 
Services, Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, 3.1, 3.4; NLADA, Standards for 
Defender Services 4.3. See also, ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 
4-4.1, 4-8.1. 
3. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-1.4 commentary. 
4. Goodpaster, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases, 58 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 299, 344-5 ( 1983). 
5. See, Dept. of Public Advocacy, KENTUCKY PUBLIC ADVOCATE DEATH 
PENAL TY MANUAL, Chapter XI, "Using Psychological Evidence in a Capital Case" 
(1983); Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, Vol. III, pg. 10.5-2 through 10.5-3 (1985). 
6. See, ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-1.4 
commentary. 
7. Goodpaster, Effective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 4, at 356; ~ 
also, Tabak, The Death Of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of 
the Death Penalty in the l980's, XIV N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 797, 801 (1986) 
(defense counsel are not generally provided sufficient funds or staff to conduct 
investigations). 
8. Tabak, The Dea th of Fairness, supra, note 7, at 804. 
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9. See ~ Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the 
Death Penalty, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1221, 1254 fn. 158 (1985). 
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STANDARD 9.1 TRAINING 
Attorneys seeking eligibility to receive appointments pursuant to these 
Standards should have completed the training requirements specified in Standard 
5.1. Attorneys seeking to remain on the roster of attorneys from which 
assignments are made should continue, on a periodic basis, to attend and 
successfully complete training or educational programs which focus on advocacy in 
death penalty cases. The legal representation plan for each jurisdiction should 
include sufficient funding to enable adequate and frequent training programs to be 
conducted for counsel in capital cases and counsel who wish to be placed on the 
roster. 
Commentary: 
Criminal law in general is a complex and difficult legal area. The skills 
involved in death penalty litigation are even more highly specialized and must be 
carefully developed. Moreover, the consequences of mistakes by defense counsel in 
capital cases may be irrevocable, including wrongful conviction and the loss of 
life.l It is critical that each jurisdiction ensure that comprehensive training 
programs which focus on advocacy in capital cases be regularly offered to 
attorneys (including private counsel and defender office staff) who are eligible to 
receive appointments pursuant to these Standards or who are seeking to become 
eligible.1 Many jurisdictions are not now providing the necessary training for local 
counsel) 
In addition to training within the jurisdiction, counsel's attendance at regional 
and national training programs should also be encouraged, if not required.± In 
recent years, intensive training for lawyers involved in capital cases has been 
provided by several different groups.l 
This Standard assumes that counsel seeking to maintain eligibility for 
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appointment in death penalty cases will also work to hone general criminal defense 
skills by attending seminars on other aspects of criminal law and procedure. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. McNally, Death is Different: Your Approach to a Capital Case Must be 
Different, Too, The Champion (:viarch 1984) pg. 10, reprinted in California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice & California Public Defenders Association, 
CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. I, pg. A-29, A-30 (1986). 
2. See ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-1.4 and 
commentary. 
3. Supreme Court Just ice Thurgood Marshall recently urged bar associations 
to establish additional training programs for death penalty lawyers. See, Marshall, 
Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second 
Circuit, 86 Columbia L. Rev. 1 ( 1986). 
4. Without specifying the location of training, the standards approved by the 
Indiana State Bar Association's Board of Managers and House of Delegates require 
attendance prior to trial at a "death penalty seminar." Res Gestae magazine 
(January 1985) pg. 37 3. 
5. £:.&, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. ; the California 
Public Defenders Association and California Attorneys For Criminal Justice; the 
Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy; and the Southern Poverty Law Center. 
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STANDARD 10.1 COMPENSATION 
(a) Capital counsel should be compensated for actual time and service 
performed. The objective should be to provide a reasonable rate of hourly 
compensation which is commensurate with the provision of effective assistance of 
counsel and which reflects the extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death 
penalty litigation. 
(b) Capital counsel should also be fully reimbursed for reasonable incidental 
expenses. 
(c) Periodic billing and payment during the course of counsel's representation 
should be provided for in the representation plan. 
Commentary: 
This Standard is rooted in the constitutional obligation of government to 
provide effective representation for poor people charged with crimes.l In order to 
fulfill that obligation, government is required to adequately compensate court-
appointed counsel for the representation they provide. As the Florida Supreme 
Court has noted, the defendant's right to effective representation is "inextricably 
interlinked" with the attorney's right to fair compensation.l 
Low fees make it economically unattractive for competent attorneys to seek 
assignments and to expend the time and effort a case may require. As of 1985, 
Virginia was paying defense lawyers in capital cases an average of $687.00 per case 
-- an amount representing an hourly wage of $1.00 in some cases.1 Such token 
compensation is plainly insufficient to cover even overhead expenses of an attorney 
assigned to a capital case, much less to adequately reimburse the attorney for his 
or her time and skill. Florida's compensation scheme (permitting a maximum 
payment of $3,500.00 per case as of 1985), while somewhat higher than Virginia's, 
must still be described as inadequate since there have been instances where the 
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effective rate counsel received was close to the Federal minimum wage.i These 
are but two examples of drastic underfunding of capital representation. 
In such situations, the temptation is too great for a lawyer to shortchange the 
client because he or she is not adequately being compensated for his or her time. 
For example, a study conducted by the National Legal Aid &: Defender Association 
documents that in 1985, 36% of the assigned counsel in Massachusetts who 
responded to a survey on the issue admitted they omitted some appropriate defense 
activity because of inadequate compensation.1 Specific types of activities omitted 
included: interviewing the client; a full investigation of the facts; interviewing 
witnesses or the police; filing pretrial motions; and adequate research of the law..2. 
Omissions of such critical activities, shocking in any case, would be 
unconscionable in cases involving defendants who face the prospect of death. For 
this reason alone, counsel in capital cases ought to receive adequate 
reimbursement for their services. 
Unreasonably low fees not only deny the defendant the right to effective 
representation, however. They also place an unfair burden on skilled criminal 
defense lawyers, especially those skilled in the highly specialized capital area. 
These attorneys are forced to work for next to nothing after assuming the 
responsibility of representing someone who faces a possible sentence of death. 
Failure to provide appropriate compensation discourages experienced criminal 
defense practitioners from accepting assignments in capital cases (which require 
counsel to expend substantial amounts of time and effort).Z. 
This Standard provides for "reasonable" compensation, which should be 
distinguished from "token" compensation. In the words of one court: "The statute 
(imposing a fee cap upon attorney compensation in capital cases) as applied to 
many of today's cases, provides for only token compensation. The availability of 
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effective counsel is therefore called into question in those cases when it is needed 
most.'& The court concluded that attorney fees which are set at "confiscatory 
rates" in capital cases impermissibly interfere with the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.2. 
Some courts have argued that criminal defense lawyers have a pro bono 
obligation to provide free (or almost free, where fees are low) services to poor 
defendants • .!Q This argument ignores the government's responsibility to provide 
effective, adequately funded representation in these 11 cases.- Furthermore, 
prosecutors and judges are not required or asked to work for nothing or next to 
nothing. It is unconscionable to impose such a burden on defense lawyers# 
No citizen can be expected to perform civilian services 
for the government when to do so is clearly confiscatory 
of his time, energy and skills, his public service is 
inadequately compensated and his industry is 
unrewarded ••• I do not believe that good public conscience 
approves such shoddy, tawdry treatment of an attorney 
called upon by the courts to represent an indigent 
defendant in a capital case..Ll. (Emphasis added). 
It should be the responsibility of each jurisdiction to develop flexible 
standards for compensation which take into consideration the number of hours 
expended plus the effort, efficiency, and skill of capital counsel.l± Among the 
criteria might be the role and experience of the attorney; less experienced co-
counsel might be compensated at a lower rate than lead defense a ttorneys.11 See 
Standards 4.1 and 5.1. Flat payment rates or arbitrary ceilings should be 
discouraged since they impact adversely upon vigorous defense representation.li 
Rather, assigned counsel should be provided a rate of hourly compensation which 
reflects the extraordinary responsibilities and commitment required of counsel in 
death penalty cases. It is also important that the compensation plan provide for 
extra payments to counsel when representation is provided in unusually protracted 
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d
. 17 or extraor mary cases.-
Periodic billing and payment -- for example, monthly -- should be available to 
avoid hardship to sole practitioners, small firms and any other appointed counsel.ll 
As the commentary to Standard 1.1 and the Standards in section 11 make clear, 
extensive preparation and long hours characterize capital representation. Office 
overhead, the need for reimbursement for expenses incurred, and for compensation 
for time already worked do not stop during a capital case. Financial hardship 
imposed by a long delay before payment for time worked and expenses incurred 
may impact adversely upon counsel's ability to provide quality representation. 
This Standard acknowledges the strong tension which exists between the 
public treasury and the obligation to fund the often high cost of providing defense 
in capital cases, but asserts that the obligation to provide adequate and effective 
representation cannot be ignored or diminished. In order to safeguard the 
defendant's right to effective representation, "it is our duty to firmly and 
unhesitatingly resolve any conflicts between the treasury and the fundamental 
constitutional rights in favor of the latter •11.!1 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; 83 S. Ct. 792; 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 
(1963}; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45; 53 S. Ct. 55; 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932). 
2. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied 
_U.S.__; 107 S. Ct. 908; 93 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1987). 
3. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious lmposi tion of 
the Death Penalty in the 1980s, XIV N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change, 797, 801 (1986). 
4. Id. at 802. 
5. NLADA, Statewide Evaluation of the Massachusetts Bar Advocate 
Program (1986), at 33. 
6. Id. at 34. 
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7. The substantial amount of time required for post conviction 
representation alone is documented in American Bar Association Standing 
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Bar Information Program 
(prepared by The Spangenberg Group), Time &: Expense Analysis in Post Conviction 
Death Penalty Cases (February 1987) pg. 9. 
8. Makemson v. Martin County, supra note 2. 
9. !g, at pg. 1115. 
10. See~ State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981); People v. 
Harflinger, 359 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. 1977). 
11. See cases cited supra note 1. The ABA has rejected the view that 
lawyers are required to provide pro bono legal services in criminal cases. See ABA 
Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.4 commentary. 
12. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.4 commentary. 
13. MacKensie v. Hillsborough County, 288 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 
l 973)(dissenting opinion), quoted in Makemson v. \.iartin County, supra note 2, at 
pg. 1114. See also, Delisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 ( Alaska 1987). 
14. ABA Standards, Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-2.4 commentary. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. See Makemson v. Martin County, supra note 2. 
18. See, American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defendants, Bar Information Program (Prepared by The Spangenberg 
Group), Caseload and Cost Projections for Federal Habeas Corpus Death Penalty 
Cases in FY 1988 and FY 1989 (Sept. 1987) pg. 74. 
19. See Makemson v. Martin County, supra note 2. 
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STANDARD 11.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
(a) The appointing authority should establish standards of performance for 
counsel appointed in death penalty cases. 
(b) The standards of performance should include, but should not be limited 
to, the specific standards set out in Standards 11.3 through 11.9. 
(c) The appointing authority should refer to the standards of performance 
when assessing the qualification of attorneys seeking to be placed on the roster 
from which appointments in death penalty cases are to be made (Standard 4.1) and 
in monitoring the performance of attorneys to determine their continuing 
eligibility to remain on the roster (Standard 7 .1). 
Commentary: 
As set out in Standard 5.1 and accompanying commentary, the appointing 
authority must determine whether attorneys seeking eligibility for appointment in 
death penalt y cases have demonstrated the quality of representation appropriate to 
those cases. Written standards of attorney performance are intended to assist the 
appointing authority in making that determination, and to assist counsel in 
achieving and maintaining eligibility. The specific performance standards of this 
section address, in addition to areas common to all criminal defense 
representation, those areas of representation in which death penalty cases differ 
from other types of criminal cases, as discussed in the Commentary to Standard 
1.1. These Standards, which are enacted as minimal levels of performance in death 
penalty cases, are, where relevant, equally applicable to all areas of criminal 
practice. 
Standards relating to attorney functions common to both capital and non-
capital cases should also be included in the standards established by the appointing 
authority, with the understanding that in capital cases the level of adherence to 
such standards must be higher (see Standard 11.2). 
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STANDARD 11.2 MINIMU~ STANDARDS NOT SUFFICIENT 
(a) Minimum standards that have been promulgated concerning representation 
of defendants in criminal cases generally, and the level of adherence to such 
standards required for non-capital cases, should not be adopted as suf ficlent for 
death penalty cases. 
(b) Counsel in death penalty cases should be required to perform at the level 
of an attorney reasonably skilled in the specialized practice of capital representa-
tion, zealously committed to the capital case, who has had adequate time and 
resources for preparation. 
Commentary: 
"Death is different,"..!.. and all rules established for the protection of the 
capital defendant should be strictly enforced. The defense of death penalty cases 
is an evolving practice and counsel should refer to state and federal death penalty 
defense training and practice manuals for preparation and trial of death penalty 
cases. When the courts are not likely to provide the proper enforcement of the 
rules sua sponte, attorneys must seek to enforce the rules, or their clients will die. 
The minimal level of attorney competence that may be accepted as sufficient in 
some jurisdictions in non-capital cases can be fatally inadequate in death penalty 
cases. For example, attorney ignorance or oversight will not constitute cause for 
failure to meet the exhaustion requirements of federal habeas corpus, unless the 
attorney's failures have been so egregious as to meet the current standard of 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.~ Under this rule, otherwise 
reversible error will be ignored by the court; the capital client, rather than serving 
an improperly imposed but unreviewable prison term because of counsel's error, 
will die. To ensure that indigent defendants will not die for, and their attorneys 
will not have to live with, such error, the standards of performance established by 
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the ap~ointing authority under Standard 11.1 should include requirements that all 
aspects of representation be intensified in a capital case) 
Some national standards have been established concerning certain aspects of 
general representation of criminal defendants • .:t. A set of complete standards is in 
the draft stage), The appointing authority may wish to refer to existing guidelines 
when establishing the standards of perfo r mance for representation in death penalty 
cases, but should not limit itself thereto. The standards to be established by the 
appointing authority should be defense standards, not minimum standards which the 
prosecution or even the courts might be willing to accept.2-
Establishment of standards is intended to assist the appointing authority and 
counsel seeking to establish and maintain eligibility. Compliance with such 
standards is not intended to be used as the sole criteria for assessing questions of 
effective assistance of counsel in a. particular case.Z. 
The education, training and experience necessary for counsel to represent a 
capital client are inherent in the eligibility requirements of Standard 5.1 and are 
not repeated in this section. For general standards regarding education, training 
and experience of criminal defense counsel, see NLADA, Performance Guidelines 
for Criminal Defense Representation, Draft Standard 1.2. Other general standards 
contained in those Guidelines which may be relevant for consideration include: 
Role of Defense Counsel (Draft Standard 1. 1) 
General Duties of Defense Counsel (Draft Standard 1.3) 
Preliminary Proceedings (Draft Standards 3.1 through 3.3) 
Discovery (Draft Standard 4.2) 
Opening Statement (Draft Standard 7 .3) 
Confronting the Prosecution's Case (Draft Standard 7 .4) 
Closing Argument (Draft Standard 7.6) 
Jury Inst ructions (Draft Standard 7 .7). 
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FOOTNOTES: 
1. See, ~ Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358; 97 S. Ct. 1197, 1204; 
51 L. Ed. 2d 393, 402 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
2. Current minimum standards, according to capital attorney David Bruck, 
have been met if a mirror held under counsel's nose clouds up, For U.S. Death-Row 
Inmates, a Lawyer Often Isn't Enough ••• , Los Angeles Daily Journal, 9/30/86. 
(Discussing the test for effective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668; 104 S. Ct. 2052; 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). See also, 
Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the 
Death Penalty in the 1980s, XIV N. Y .U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 797, 805-807 (1986). 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. _; 106 S. Ct. 2639; 91 L.Ed. 2d 397 (1986) 
holds that ignorance or oversight of attorney does not equal "cause" unless external 
factors such as interference by government officials intervened in the defense, or 
unless counsel's representation amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance. 
3. The appointing authority should not limit itself to the view of those courts 
which state that while death is different, the same legal principles govern 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital and non-capital cases, ~ e.g. 
Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 962-963 (11th Cir. 1983). The standards established 
by the appointing authority should clearly state that more is expected of capital 
counsel. Review by the appointing authority should likewise be intensified, 
compared to the scrutiny that might be given under a system to appoint counsel in 
non-capital cases. The instant Standards follow the logic of at least one court 
which recognized that courts "must strictly scrutinize counsel's conduct" in death 
penalty cases, Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F. Supp. 901, 910 (N.D. Miss. 1980), cited in 
Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Ga. 1981); contra, Washington v. Watkins, 655 
F.2d 1346, 1356-1357 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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4. ABA Standards, The Defense Function; ABA Standards, Providing Defense 
Services; NLADA, Standards for Defender Services; National Study Commission on 
Defense Services, Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the United States. 
5. NLADA Grant Award from the Bar Information Program of the ABA 
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, August 22, 1985. 
6. As noted above, some courts have held that the standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel is not different in capital than in non-capital cases, 
Washington v. Watkins, 655 F .2d 1346, 1356-1357 (.5th Cir. 1981). 
7. For an example of standards for defense counsel that are intended for use 
in determining eligibility but not as the sole basis for examining claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, see Rule 65, Qualifications for Eligibility to be 
Court-Appointed Counsel for Indigent Capital Defendant in the Courts of Ohio, 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio October 14, 1987, Subcommit tee Comments 
to section I. 
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STANDARD 11.3 DETERMINING THAT DEATH PENAL TY IS BEING SOUGHT 
Counsel appointed in any case in which the death penalty is a possible 
punishment should, even if the prosecutor has not indicated that the death penalty 
will be sought, begin preparation for the case as one in which the death penalty will 
be sought while employing strategies to have the case designated by the prosecu-
tion as a non-capital one. 
Commentary: 
Jurisdictions may vary in how and when the prosecutor makes the determina-
tion of whether to request the death penalty. Jurisdictions vary significantly as 
to when the defense must be notified of the specific aggravating factors upon 
which the prosecution will rely in seeking the death penalty • .!. If there is any 
possibility that the death penalty will be sought, counsel should proceed as if it will 
be sought. As is set out in Standard 11.4, early investigation is a necessity, and 
should not be put off on some possibility that the death penalty will not be 
requested, or that the request will be dropped at a later point • .£ 
If required notice has not been given, counsel is "under no duty to invite a 
death penalty prosecution."l While preparing for a capital case when notice has not 
been given, counsel should also prepare to challenge at the sentencing phase any 
prosecution efforts that should be barred for failure to give notice.i 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. A list of cases from jurisdictions requiring specific aggravating factors to 
be disclosed prior to the guilt/innocence trial and from jurisdictions with no such 
requirement is found in Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 798, 804-85 (Miss. 1984) cert. 
denied sub ~ Williams v. ~ississippi, 469 U.S. 1117; 105 S. Ct. 803; 83 L. Ed. 2d 
795 (1985). One of the cases cited is Sired v. State, 399 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1981). In 
rejecting the defendant's claim that aggravating circumstances had to be listed in 
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the indictment, the court said that "when one is charged with murder in the first 
degree, he is well aware of the fact that it is a capital felony punishable by a 
maximum sentence of death ••• ," 399 So. 2d at 970. Sireci has been cited in a later 
decision precluding the trial court from ruling prior to the guilt/innocence phase on 
the propriety of the case being pursued as a death penalty case, State v. Bloom, 
!+97 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986). 
2. California Attorneys for Criminal Justice & California Public Defenders 
Association, CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. I, pg A-13 
!:.,! seg. (1986), citing inter alia Leo v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 27ft; 225 Cal. 
Rptr. 15 (1986) review denied 6/20/86. In Leo, the court found no bar to the 
prosecution pursuing the death penalty despite having initially told the defense 
(almost four months earlier) that death would not be sought, so long as the case 
was still in the pretrial stage. 
3. Dept. of Public Advocacy, KENTUCKY PUBLIC ADVOCATE DEATH 
PENAL TY MANUAL, pg. 290 (1983). 
l+. Id. 
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STANDARD 11.4.l INVESTIGATION 
(a) Counsel should conduct independent investigations relating to the guilt/ 
innocence phase and to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Both invest igations 
should begin immediately upon counsel's entry into the case and should be pursued 
expeditiously. 
(b) The investigation for preparation of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial 
should be conducted regardless of any admission or statement by the client 
concerning facts constituting guilt. 
(c) The investigation for preparation of the sentencing phase should be 
conducted regardless of any initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to 
be offered. This investigation should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably 
available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that 
may be introduced by the prosecutor. 
(d) Sources of investigative information may include the following: 
( 1) Charging documents: 
Copies of all charging documents in the case should be obtained 
and examined in the context of the applicable statues and 
precedents, to identify (inter alia): ----
(A) the elements of the charged offense(s), including the 
element(s) alleged to make the death penalty 
applicable; 
(B) the defenses, ordinary and affirmative, that may be 
available to the substantive charge and to the 
applicability of the death penalty; 
(C) any issues, constitutional or otherwise, (such as statutes 
of limitations or double jeopardy) which can be raised 
to attack the charging documents. 
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(2) The accused: 
An in-depth interview of the client should be conducted within 
24 hours of counsel's entry into the case unless there is a good 
reason for counsel to postpone this interview. In that event, the 
interview should be conducted as soon as possible after counsel's 
appointment. As soon as is appropr iate, counsel should cover A-
E below (if this is not possible during the initial interview, these 
steps should be accomplished as soon as possible thereafter): 
(A) seek information concerning the incident or events 
giving rise to the charge(s), and any improper police 
investigative practice or prosecutorial conduct which 
affects the client's rights; 
(B) explore the existence of other potential sources of 
information relating to the offense, the client's mental 
state, and the presence or absence of any aggravating 
factors under the applicable death penalty statute and 
any mitigating factors; 
(C) collect information relevant to the sentencing phase of 
trial including, but not limited to: medical history 
(mental and physical illness or injury, alcohol and drug 
use, birth trauma and developmental delays); 
educational history (achievement, performance and 
behavior); special educational needs (including cognitive 
limitations and learning disabilities); military history 
(type and length of service, conduct, special training); 
employment and training history (including skills and 
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performance, and barriers to employability); family and 
social history (including physical, sexual or emotional 
abuse); prior adult and juvenile record; prior 
correctional experience (including conduct on 
supervision and in the institution, education or training, 
and clinical services); and religious and cultural 
influences. 
(D) seek necessary releases for securing confidential 
records relating to any of the relevant histories. 
(E) obtain names of collateral persons or sources to verify, 
corroborate, explain and expand upon information 
obtained in (C) above. 
(3) Potential witnesses: 
Counsel should consider interviewing potential witnesses, 
including: 
(A) eyewitnesses or other witnesses having purported 
knowledge of events surrounding the offense itself; 
(13) witnesses familiar with aspects of the client's life 
history that might affect the likelihood that the client 
committed the charged offense(s), possible mitigating 
reasons for the offense(s), and/or other mitigating 
evidence to show why the client should not be 
sentenced to death; 
(C) members of the victim's family opposed to having the 
client killed. 
- 64 -
Counsel should attempt to conduct interviews of potential 
witnesses in the presence of a third person who will be available, 
if necessary, to testify as a defense witness at trial. 
Alternatively, counsel should have an investigator or mitigation 
specialist conduct the interviews. 
(4) The police and prosecution: 
Counsel should make efforts to secure information in the 
possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities, 
including police reports. Where necessary, counsel should pursue 
such efforts through formal and informal discovery unless a 
sound tactical reason exists for not doing so. 
(5) Physical evidence: 
Where appropriate, counsel should make a prompt request to the 
police or investigative agency for any physical ev idence or 
expert reports relevant to the offense or sentencing. 
(6) The scene: 
Where appropriate, counsel should attempt to view the scene of 
the alleged offense. This should be done under circurns tances as 
similar as possible to those existing at the time of the alleged 
incident (e.g. weather, time of day, and lighting conditions). 
(7) Expert assistance: 
Counsel should secure the assistance of experts where it is 
necessary or appropriate for: 
(A) preparation of the defense; 
(B) adequate understanding of the prosecution's case; 
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(C) rebuttal of any portion of the prosecution's case at the 
guilt/innocence phase or the sentencing phase of the 
trial; 
(D) presentation of mitigation. 
Experts assisting in investigation and other preparation of the defense should be 
independent and their work product should be confidential to the extent allowed by 
law. Counsel and support staff should use all available avenues including signed 
releases, subpoenas, and Freedom of Information Acts, to obtain all necessary 
information. 
Commentary: 
Counsel has a duty to investigate the case before recommending that a guilty 
plea be taken (or sought) or proceeding to trial.! This duty is intensified (as are 
many duties) by the unique nature of the death penalty.£ and is broadened by the 
bifurcation of capital trials into two phases.l 
The need for a standard mandating investigation for the sent.encing phase is 
underscored by cases in which counsel failed to recognize the importance of this 
aspect of death penalty litigation. Inexperienced counsel -- and even counsel 
experienced in non-capital cases -- "may underestimate the importance of develop-
ing meaningful sources of mitigating evidence •• . "!±. See Standard 11.8 and 
commentary. 
Counsel's duty to investigate is not negated by the expressed desires of a 
client. Nor may counsel "sit idly by, thinking that investigation would be futile".2 
The attorney must first evaluate the potential avenues of action and then advise 
the client on the merits of each.~ Without investigation, counsel's evaluation and 
advice amount to little more than a guess. 
Resources that counsel needs to pursue a proper investigation should be 
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sought early in the case. The type and amount of assistance that can or will be 
made available varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; counsel should demand on 
behalf of the client all necessary experts for preparation of both phases of tria l.Z. 
Individuals assisting in investigation should be within the confidences o f the 
client and defense counsel, and should not be required to disclose information 
discovered during the investigation except at the direction of counsel • .§. 
Immediate contact with the client is necessary not only to gain information 
needed to secure evidence and crucial witnesses, but to try to prevent uncounselled 
confessions-2. or admissions: 
Don't forget, the defendant is a part of this team. From the 
initial interview forward the bond you develop with the 
defendant is important in how you are able to handle the case. 
Your initial interv iew will often, by necessity, be hasty. 
Strongly admonish your client to talk or write to no one 
regarding the case. A former client of this author is sitting on 
death row in part because of devastatingly harmful letters that 
client wrote after the appointment of counsel. This admonition 
should be renewed regularly during trial, after conviction, and 
throughout the appellate process. In the event of a retrial, 
damaging post-trial statements may crucify your client. 
As soon as time permits arrange for an in-depth interview with 
your client with an eye toward both developing the necessary 
trust and eliciting as many facts as 1-ou can to start you on the 
road to formulating your defense •• ..!Q 
Client interviews are vital for establishing the trust between attorney and client 
necessary to allow the attorney to learn the facts. Counsel cannot frame an 
adequate defense without knowing what is likely to develop . at trial, including 
information that is or that appears to be incriminating.ll 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standards 4-4.1 and 4-6.l; NLADA, 
Performance Guidelines For Criminal Defense Representation (Draft Standard 4.1). 
2. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706; 104 S. Ct. 20 52; 80 L. Ed. 
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2d 674 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
3. See, Streib, Execution Under the Post-Furman Capital Punishment 
Statutes: the Halting Progress from "Let's Do It" to "Hey, There Ain't No Point in 
Pulling So Tight", 15 Rutgers L. J. 443, 446 (1984). 
4. Devine, et~ Special Project: The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
in New Jersey, 15 Rutgers L.J. 261, 293 (1984). 
5. Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F. Supp. 901, 910 (N.D. Miss. 1980). People v. 
Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d 171, 200-204, 207-209, 221-223; 238 Cal. Rptr. 404; 729 P.2d 
839 (1987). 
6. Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir. 1986), citing 
inter alia, Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1986, 1093-1094 (5th Cir. 1982). Despite its 
recognition of the need for investigation, the Thompson court cited Strickland v. 
Washington, supra note 2, and declined to reverse where the attorney had failed to 
investigate the co-defendant's background, and had not contacted for sentencing 
purposes the psychiatrists who had previously examined the defendant. 
7. The Supreme Court has recognized that indigent defendants are entitled 
to some forms of expert assistance, see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68; 105 S. Ct. 
1087; 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985). Some states provide funds by statute for preparation 
of a capital case,~·&.· California Penal Code sec. 987.9. 
8. The California statute providing funds for defense investigation in capital 
cases shields even the request for assistance from the prosecutor, Cal. Penal Code 
sec. 987.9; see, People v. Corenevsky, 36 Cal. 3d 307, 321; 204 Cal. Rptr. 165; 
682 P. 360 (1984). 
9. See, Gradess, "The Road From Scottsboro," Vol.2, 112 Criminal Justice 
(Magazine of the ABA Section on Criminal Justice), pg. 1, 45 (Summer 1987). 
1 O. Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEA TH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
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MANUAL, Vol. I, pg 1.1-6 (1985). 
11. ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-3.2 commentary. 
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STANDARD 11.4.2 CLIENT CONTACT 
Trial counsel should maintain close contact with the client throughout 
preparation of the case, discussing (inter alia) the investigation, potential legal 
issues that exist or develop, and the development of a defense theory. 
Commentary: 
Counsel always has a duty to interview the client,l to keep the client 
informed of developments and progress in the case,1 and to consult with the client 
on strategic and tactical matters. Some decisions require the client's knowledge 
and agreement; others, which may be made by counsel, require full consultation 
with the client beforehand.1 Certainly, full consultation during the process of plea 
negotiation in a capital case is crucial, Standard 11.6.1, 11.6.3 and accompanying 
commentary. 
One hurried interview with the client will not reveal to counsel all the facts 
counsel needs in order to prepare for a capital trial, appeal, or post conviction 
review, as discussed in the commentary to Standard 11.4.1. Any reluctance on the 
part of the client to disclose needed information must be overcome,! not a quick or 
easy task. 
Ongoing client contact is therefore important both practically and ethically. 
In preparing for trial, the client must be involved: 
You must maintain enough client control to prevent him or her 
from blundering, yet give your client enough freedom of 
expression to feel a part of the defense team. There are two 
important reasons for this in a death case: (1) it is, after all, the 
defendant's life you are trying to save, and (2) you're going to 
have to humanize the defendant before the jury, and having the 
defendant actively involved in all phases of the case is a giant 
step in that direction.2. 
The rapport built up between counsel and the client during the preparation of the 
case is a vital part of being able to present the best possible case in mitigation at 
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the sentencing phase.I Post judgment counsel must not only consult with the client 
but monitor the client's personal condition for potential lega l consequences, 
Standard l 1.9.1, Standard l 1.9.5 and accompanying commentary. 
Counsel's general duty to maintain client contact is compounded in a capital 
case. The complexity and unique nature of the legal proceedings, stemming from 
their potentially lethal outcome, mandate careful consultation with the person who 
may be killed. Furthermore, counsel may have to try to keep the client from 
making suicidal choices about the case. Capital counsel frequently "must not only 
struggle against the public and prosecution but against the self-destructive 
behavior of the client as well."Z While involving the client in preparation of the 
case is no guarantee that the client will not make a self-destructive choice during 
the preparation of his or her case, such involvement may greatly reduce the 
potential for a self-destructive choice. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-3.2. 
2. ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-3.8. 
3. ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2. 
4. See, ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-1.2 commentary. 
5. Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, Vol. I, pg 1.1-6 (1985). 
6. McNally, Death is Different: Your Approach to a Capital Case \'\ust Be 
Different, Too, The Champion (~arch 1984) pg. 26, 35, reprinted in California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice & California Public Defenders Association, 
CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. I, pg. A-29, A-35 (1986). 
7. McNally, supra note 6, giving examples of defendants who (over their 
attorneys' advice) actively sought death at the sentencing phase. 
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STANDARD 11.5.1 THE DECISION TO FILE PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
(a} Counsel should consider filing a pretrial motion whenever there exists 
reason to believe that applicable law may entitle the client to relief or that legal 
and/or policy arguments can be made that the law should provide the requested 
relief. 
(b} Counsel should consider all pretrial motions potentially available, and 
should evaluate them in light of the unique circumstances of a capital case, 
including the potential impact of any pretrial motion or ruling on the strategy for 
the sentencing phase, and the likelihood that all available avenues of appellate and 
post conviction relief will be sought in the event of conviction and imposition of a 
death sentence. Among the issues that counsel should consider addressing in a 
pretrial motion are: 
(l} the pretrial custody of the accused; 
(2) the constitutionality o f the implicated statute or statutes; 
(3) the potential defects in the charging process; 
(4) the sufficiency of the charging document; 
(5) the propriety and prejudice of any joinder of charges or defendants in 
the charging document; 
(6) the discovery obligations of the prosecut ion including disclosure of 
aggravating factors to be used in seeking the death penalty, and any 
reciprocal discovery obligations of the defense; 
(7) the suppression of evidence gathered as the result of violations of the 
Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
including: 
(A) the fruits of illegal searches or seizures; 
(B} involuntary statements or confessions; statements or 
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confessions obtained in violation of the accused's right to 
counsel, or privilege against self-incrimination; 
(C) unreliable identification testimony which would give rise to a 
substantial likelihood of irreparable m iside nti fica t ion; 
(8) suppression of evidence gathered in violation of any right, duty or 
privilege ar ising out of state or local law; 
(9) access to resources which may be denied to the client because of 
indigency and which may be necessary in the case, including independent 
and confidential investigative resources, jury selection assistance, and 
expert witnesses concerning not only the charged offense(s) and the 
client's mental condition, but also the criminal justice system itself; 
(10) the defendant's right to a speedy trial; 
(11) the defendant's right to a continuance in order to adequately prepare 
his or her case; 
(12) matters of evidence or procedure at either the guilt/innocence or 
penalty phase of trial which may be appropriately litigated by means of a 
pretrial motion in limine, including requests for sequestered, individual 
voir dire as to the death qualification of jurors and any challenges to 
overly restrictive rules or procedures; 
(13) matters of trial or courtroom procedure; 
(14) change of venue; 
(15) abuse of prosecutorial discretion in seeking the death penalty; 
(16) challenges to the process of establishing the jury venire. 
Commentary: 
Counsel in a death penalty case must be especially aware at all trial level 
stages not only of strategies for winning at that level but also of the need to fully 
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preserve issues for later review. Whether raising a pretrial issue specific to a 
capital case (such as requesting individual, sequestered voir dire on death-
qualification of the jury) or a more common motion shaped by the capital aspect of 
the case (such as requesting a change of venue because of publicity), counsel should 
be sure to litigate both the legal basis and factual need for the request.l This will 
increase the likelihood that the request will be granted and will also fully preserve 
the issue for post judgment review in the event the motion is denied. Some 
jurisdictions have strict contemporaneous objection rules that will forestall post 
judgment relief if an issue was not litigated at the first opportunity.l (See also 
the commentary accompanying Standard ll.2.) 
The possibility that the client will be sentenced to death increases the need 
to litigate potential issues at all levels. With the client's life hanging in the 
balance, trial counsel's perception that the effort needed to bring the motion 
probably outweighs the chances of the motion being granted should not alone 
preclude filing of the motion.2. Similarly, "law reform" issues calling for a change 
in existing precedent, which might not be litigated in a less-serious case when they 
arise, should be considered in capital cases, especially where the likelihood of 
conviction is high. Systemic issues alone cannot be relied upon to stave off 
executions,!t. but still offer an opportunity to seek reversal of the conviction and/or 
sentence. 
There has been a recent "speed-up" of capital cases through the post 
judgment courts), Law reform and other pretrial issues should be litigated as fully 
as possible in the trial court so that later courts can be quickly apprised of the 
merits of the issue, thereby increasing the chance that a stay of execution will be 
granted to allow thorough consideration. 
Appropriate pretrial motions, filed and zealously pursued, may provide a basis 
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not only for appeal but for plea bargainingJ The Washington Supreme Court has 
recently held that a defendant can validly waive the right to appeal as part of a 
plea bargain.I At least in death penalty jurisdictions following the Washington 
rule, a prosecutor who is concerned that issues raised prior to trial threaten the 
finality of any conviction obtained thereafter may become more willing to forego 
the opportunity to seek the client's death in exchange for a waiver of those pretrial 
issues. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL Vol. I, pg. 2-1 et seq. (1985). 
2. Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, THE TACDL DEATH 
PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL: TOOLS FOR THE ULTIMATE TRIAL, section IV, 
Trial Considerations, (1985), reprinted in INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
\1ANUAL, supra note 1, Vol. II, pg. 6-1.l and 6-1.10 through 6-1.12. 
3. Some courts may still adhere to the idea that questions arising in capital 
cases must be given more careful scrutiny, increasing the chance of eventually 
winning a motion issue,~.&:. People v. :'-Aartinez, 29 Cal. 3d 574, 585; 174 Cal. Rptr. 
701; 629 P.2d 502 (1981) (when a defendant's life is at stake, particular significance 
is imparted to the rule that doubts about changing venue should be resolved in 
favor of the change). 
4. "Systemic issues kill. If you rely on a systemic issue for your client, your 
client will be gone." Capital attorney Millard Farmer, speaking at a March 14, 1987 
Oregon sem inar, quoted in VIII, /13 The Oregon Defense Attorney, pg. 5 (April/May, 
1987). 
5. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of 
the Death Penalty in the 1980s, XIV N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 797, 334-838 
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(1936) citing, inter alia, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880; 103 S. Ct. 3383; 77 L. Ed. 
2d 1090 (1983) and 3rd Cir. Rule 29 (3) (b) and 5th Cir. Rule 8. 
6. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capita! Cases, l3 Akron L. Rev. 
331, 335-337 (1979). 
7. State v. Perkins, 108 Wash. 2nd 212; 737 P.2d 250 (1987). 
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STANDARD 11.6.l THE PLEA NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
(a) Counsel should explore with the client the possibility and desirability of 
reaching a negotiated disposition of the charges rather than proceeding to a trial. 
In so doing, counsel should fully explain the rights that would be waived by a 
decision to enter a plea instead of proceeding to trial, and should explain the legal 
and/or factual considerations that bear on the potential results of going to trial. 
(b) Counsel should ordinarily obtain the consent of the client before 
entering into any plea negotiations. 
(c) Counsel should keep the client fully informed of any continued plea 
discussion or negotiations, convey to the client any offers made by the prosecution 
for a negotiated settlement and discuss with the client possible strategies for 
obtaining an offer from the prosecution. 
(d) Counsel should not accept any plea agreement without the client's 
express authorization. 
(e) The existence of ongoing plea negotiations with the prosecution does 
not relieve counsel of the obligation to take steps necessary to prepare a defense. 
If a negotiated disposition wou ld be in the best interest of the client, initial 
refusals by the prosecutor to negotiate should not prevent counsel from making 
further efforts to negotiate. 
Commentary: 
Where the prosecution has chosen to seek the death penalty against the 
client, evidence of the client's guilt is frequently strong • .!. In such cases, the 
benefits to the client of a negotiated settlement precluding imposition of the death 
penalty are great, and the prosecution's inclination to offer a plea bargain probably 
small. One pract itioner has stated that "Death is different because avoiding 
execution is, in many capital cases, the best and only realistic result possible" and 
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that as a result, plea bargains in capital cases are not usually "offered" but instead 
2 
must be "pursued and won."-
If the possibility of a negotiated disposition is rejected by either the 
prosecution or the client when a settlement appears to counsel to be in the client's 
best interest, counsel should continue efforts to negotiate a plea agreementl while 
also continuing to prepare for trial as set out in Standards 11.4.1 through 11.7.1. If it 
is counsel's perception that the death penalty is being sought primarily to allow 
selection of a death-qualified (and therefore conviction-prone) jury, counsel should 
seek not only through plea negotiations but through pretrial motions (Standard 11.5.l 
(b) (3)) to change the charge to a non-capital one, while continuing preparation for 
a capital trial. 
Where the client faces execution upon conviction, counsel should not let 
belief in the strength of the defense case, in his or her own ability as an advocate, 
or even in the client's innocence foreclose exploration of a negotiated settlement.i 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Dees, Communication with State Urged in Death Penalty Case, reprinted 
courtesy of Southern Law Poverty Center in California Attorneys for Criminal 
Justice and California Public Defenders Association, CALIFORNIA DEATH 
PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. I, pg. A-50 (1986). 
2. McNally, Death is Different: Your Approach to a Capital Case \,ust be 
Different, Too, The Champion (March 1984) reprinted in CALIFORNIA DEATH 
PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 1, pg. A-36. 
3. Butler, excerpt of article in OHIO DEATH PENAL TY MANUAL, reprinted 
in Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, Vol. I, pg. 1.3-1 through 1.3-3 (1985). 
4. ld., at 1.3-1, noting that there is precedent for an accused who protests 
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innocence to still plead to life rather than r isk death, citing North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25; 91 S. Ct. 160; 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970); ~ also, \t\cNally, supra 
note 2. 
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STANDARD 11.6.2 THE CONTENTS OF PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
{a) In order to develop an overall negotiation plan, counsel should be fully 
aware of and make sure the client is fully aware of: 
{l) the maximum penalty that may be imposed for the charged offense{s) 
and any possible lesser included offenses; 
(2) where applicable, any collateral consequences of potential penalties 
less than death, such as forfeiture of assets, deportation and civil 
liabilities, as well as direct consequences of potential penalties less than 
death, such as the possibility and likelihood of parole, place of 
confinement and good-time credits; 
(3) the general range of sentences for similar offenses committed by 
defendants with similar backgrounds, and the impact of any applicable 
sentencing guidelines or mandatory sentencing requirements. 
{b) In developing a negotiation strategy, counsel should be completely 
familiar with, inter alia: 
{l) concessions that the client might offer, such as: 
{A) an agreement not to proceed to trial on the :nerits of the 
charges; 
(13) an agreement not to assert or further Ii tigate particular legal 
issues; 
(C) an agreement to provide the prosecution with assistance in 
investigating or prosecuting the present case or other alleged 
criminal activity; 
(D) an agreement to engage in or refrain from any other conduct, 
appropriate to the case. 
(2) benefits the client might obtain from a negotiated settlement, 
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including inter alia: 
(A) a guarantee that the death penalty will not be imposed; 
(B) an agreement that the defendant will receive, with the assent of 
the court, a specified sentence; 
(C) an agreement that the prosecutor will not advocate a certain 
sentence, will not present certain information to the court, or will 
engage in or refrain from engaging in other actions with regard to 
sentencing; 
(O) an agreement that one or more of multiple charges will be reduced 
or dismissed; 
(E) an agreement that the client will not be subject to further 
investigation or prosecution for uncharged alleged or suspected 
criminal conduct; 
(F) an agreement that the client may enter a conditional plea to 
preserve the right to further contest certain issu~s affecting the 
validity of the conviction. 
(c) In conducting plea negotiations, counsel should be familiar with: 
(1) the types of pleas that may be agreed to, such as a plea of guilty, a 
conditional plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere or other plea which 
does not require the client to personally acknowledge guilt; 
(2) the advantages and disadvantages of each available plea according to 
the circumstances of the case; 
(3) whether a plea agreement can be made binding on the court and on 
penal/parole authorities. 
(d) In conducting plea negotiations, counsel should attempt to become 
familiar with the practice and policies of the particular jurisdiction, the 
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judge and prosecuting authority, the family of the alleged victim and any 
other persons or entities which may affect the content and likely results of 
plea negotiations. 
Commentary: 
Plea negotiations in any type of case are difficult to describe, much less 
standardize. A multitude of factual and legal considerations must be weighed, 
many of which cannot be set out in a checklist.!.. When the death penalty is being 
sought by the prosecution, more than a new topic for negotiation is added. 
Emotional and political pressures are created that affect the substance and form of 
bargaining. For example, prosecutors who are normally open to informal hallway 
discussions may demand formal conferences or assert that negotiations are out of 
the question completely; outrage from the family of the alleged victim or the 
media may cause the prosecutor to renege on, or the court to refuse, a bargain 
once made. Many bases for bargaining in non-capital cases (questions concerning 
pre-trial or pre-sentence release, probation, or even parole) will be, in most capital 
cases, irrelevant. Considerations such as potential forfeiture of assets or amount 
of restitution which might be of great importance in a non-capital case dim in the 
glare of a potential execution, and a client's offer to help solve several open 
robbery cases, normally a strong bargaining point, may not interest police or a 
prosecutor bent on having that client executed as a notorious murderer. 
Counsel should insist that no plea to an offense for which the death penalty 
can be imposed will be considered without a written guarantee, binding on the 
court or other final sentencer, that death will not be imposed.I Whatever plea 
agreement is made should be placed fully on the record, Standard 11.6.4. 
A very difficult but important part of capital plea negotiation is contact with 
the family of the alleged victim.-2· The family's acquiescence can yield a 
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settlement,-:!. and even if the approach is unsuccessful, the defense has sought to 
demonstrate that it is not responsible for an unreasonable failure to settle the 
case.2 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. "Since disposition by plea is mutually advantageous in many 
circumstances, plea discussions are a significant part of the duty of defense 
counsel. Courts and prosecutors have developed criteria that guide the exercise of 
their discretion. These standards and rules of thumb are not to be found in codes, 
case reports, and other sources of law, but a working understanding of them is part 
of the accumulated skill and experience of the defense lawyer. Ignorance of the 
prevailing practices and attitudes of the prosecutor and the court as to plea 
discussions may be as much a handicap to effective representation as is 
unfamiliarity with the facts or law related to the case; hence it is imperative that 
the defense lawyer be aware of them. If the defense lawyer lacks sufficient 
personal experience, he or she should consult experienced colleagues. The staff of 
defender of fices also serves as a repository of such information, to which all 
members of the bar may turn." ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 
4-6.1 commentary, pg 4-72. 
2. "On two occasions to date, counsel in Kentucky capital murder cases have 
pied their clients guilty, and subsequently put on a penalty hearing in front of the 
trial court. Both cases resulted in death sentences. Commonwealth v. Bowling, 
(Rowan Co. Ind. No. 80-CR-043); Commonwealth v. Bevins (Floyd Co. Ind. No. 82-
CR-016). It is suggested that this is an effective strategy only when the attorney 
knows without any doubt that no death sentence will result. Any other 'strategy' 
for entering a guilty plea is ill-advised and should be abandoned." Dept. of Public 
Advocacy, KENTUCKY PUBLIC ADVOCATE DEATH PENAL TY MANUAL, pg. 
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328-333 (1983). 
3. ~cNally, Death is Different: Your Approach to a Capital Case ~1tust be 
Different, Too, The Champion (March 1984) pg. 15 and Dees, Communication with 
State Urged in Death Case, both reprinted in California Attorneys for Criminal 
Justice and California Public Defenders Association, CALIFORNIA DEA TH 
PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. I, pg. A-29 ~seq.and A-50 et seq. 
4. Id. 
5. Butler, excerpt of article in OHIO DEA TH PENAL TY MANUAL, reprinted 
in Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, Vol. I, pg. 1.3-3, (1985). 
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STANDARD 11.6.3 THE DECISION TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY 
(a) Counsel should inform the client of any tentative negotiated agreement 
reached with the prosecution, and explain to the client the full content of the 
agreement along with the advantages, disadvantages and potential consequences of 
the agreement. 
(b) The decision to enter or to not enter a plea of guilty should be based 
solely on the client's best interest. 
Commentary: 
In non-capital cases, the decision to enter a plea of guilty rests solely with 
the client.l When the decision to plead guilty is likely to result in the client's 
death, however, counsel's position is unique. If no written guarantee can be 
obtained that death will not be imposed following a plea of guilty, counsel should 
be extremely reluctant to participate in a waiver of the client's trial rights. In 
California at least, a defendant cannot plead guilty over the objection of the 
attorney ,l giving counsel a tremendous responsibility for the client's life. 
In other words, counsel must strive to convince a client to overcome natural 
emotional resistance to the idea of standing in open court and admit ting guilt of 
what was charged as a capital offense if that will save the client's life.l 
Conversely, counsel must strive to prevent a (perhaps depressed or suicidal) client 
from pleading guilty where there is a likelihood that such a plea will result in a 
death sentence. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. NLADA, Performance Guidelines For Criminal Defense Representation 
(Draft Standard 6.3 (b)); ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2 (a) 
(i). 
2. People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739; 170 Cal. Rptr. 798; 621 P.2d 837 (1981); 
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Cal. Penal Code 1018. 
3. Butler, excerpt from an article in the OHIO DEATH PENAL TY v\ANUAL, 
reprinted in Indiana Public Defender Counsel, INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY 
DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. I, pg. 1.3-1, 1.3-3 (1985). 
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STANDARD 11.6.4 ENTRY OF THE PLEA BEFORE THE COURT 
(a) Prior to the entry of the plea, counsel should: 
(1) make certain that the client understands the rights he or she will 
waive by entering the plea and that the client's decision to waive those 
rights ls knowing, voluntary and intelligent; 
(2) make certain that the client fully and completely understands the 
conditions and limits of the plea agreement and the maximum punishment, 
sanctions and other consequences the client wlll be exposed to by entering 
a plea; 
(3) explain to the client the nature of the plea hearing and prepare the 
client for the role he or she will play in the hearing, including answering 
questions from the judge and providing a statement concerning the 
offense. 
(b) During entry of the plea, counsel should make sure that the full content 
and conditions of the plea agreement are placed on the record before the court. 
Commentary: 
This Standard is taken from a draft of general defense attorney performance 
standards. 1 However, a requirement that counsel be prepared to address the 
question of release pending sentencing has been omitted, as it would be a ra re 
capital case in which this option would be available. When the plea being offered 
would allow a reasonable argument for pre-sentence release, of course, counsel 
should be prepared to make that arguinent. Similarly , no standard regarding 
advocacy for pret rial release has been lncluded .l 
The condltlons of any negotiated settlement should be set forth as clearly as 
possible on the record, to avoid later interpretations disadvantageous to the 
l. 3 c 1ent.-
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FOOTNOTES: 
1. NLADA, Performance Guidelines For Criminal Defense Representat ion 
(Draft Standard 6.4). 
2. See, NLADA, Performance Guidelines, supra note 1, (Draft Standard 2.3). 
3. In Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. _; 107 S. Ct. __; 97 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1987), a defendant had pled guilty to second degree murder in exchange for 
testifying against his codefendants. He later asserted that he had met the 
conditions of the bargain by testifying at the codefendants' original trial, and 
refused to testify at retrial following reversal of the codefendants' convictions. 
The defendant's own conviction and prison sentence were then vacated, he was 
tried for capital murder and sentenced to death. 
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STANDARD 11.7.1 GENERAL TRIAL PREPARATION 
(a) As the investigations mandated by Standard 11.4. l produce information, 
counsel should formulate a defense theory. In doing so, counsel should consider 
both the guilt/innocence phase and the penalty phase, and seek a theory that will 
be effective through both phases. 
(b) If inconsistencies between guilt/innocence and penalty phase defenses 
arise, counsel should seek to minimize them by procedural or substantive tactics. 
Commentary: 
Formulation of and adherence to a defense theory are vital in any criminal 
case.l In the bifurcated proceedings of a capital trial, the defense theory is 
. 11 . 2 espec1a y important.-
Counsel should discuss the theory and strategy for both phases with the client 
throughout trial preparation to maintain an effective defense through both phases. 
While some steps can be attempted to alleviate the harm of inconsistent defenses,l 
it is important that counsel consider throughout the guilt/innocence phase how new 
developments and information may impact on the sentencing phase theory, and 
adjust accordingly.i 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. See ~ &. Bailey and Rothblatt, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF 
CRIMINAL CASES, (2d ed.) sec. 1:3. 
2. See, Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY 
DEFENSE MANUAL Vol. II, pg. 7.4-42 (1985); Dept. of Public Advocacy, 
KENTUCKY PUBLIC ADVOCATE DEATH PENAL TY MANUAL, pg. 286-239 (1983). 
3. Counsel may, for instance, seek a different jury for sentencing in 
jurisdictions where sentencing is done by the jury. See, Tabak, The Death of 
Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 
- 89 -
1980s, XIV N.Y.U. Rev. L. &: Soc. Change, 797, 808 n. 72 (1986). There is no 
guarantee that a separate sentencing jury will be empaneled, ~ State v. Shields, 
15 Ohio App. 112; 472 N.E. 2d 1110 (1984) (bifurcated trial using the same jury not 
i rnproper even though defense counsel must choose between defenses). 
4. INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 2, pg. 6-1.4. 
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STANDARD 11.7.2 VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION 
(a) Counsel should consider, along with potential legal challenges to the 
procedures for selecting the jury that would be available in any criminal case, 
whether any procedures have been instituted for selection of juries in capital cases 
that present potential legal bases for challenge. 
(b) Counsel should be familiar with the precedents relating to questioning 
and challenging of potential jurors, including the procedures surrounding "death 
qualification" concerning any potent ial juror's beliefs about the death penalty. 
Counsel should be familiar with techniques for rehabilitating potent ial jurors whose 
initial indications of opposition to the death penalty make them possibly 
excludable. 
Commentary: 
One singular aspect of capital cases is the problem of "death qualified" juries, 
which result from exclusion of potential jurors whose opposition to capital 
punishment effectively skews the jury pool not only as to imposition of the death 
penalty but as to conviction • .!. Caselaw stemming fro:-n the landmark Witherspoon 
decision is extensivef, and has resulted in a highly specialized and technical 
procedure) The importance of seeking to rehabilitate prospective jurors who have 
indicated opposit ion to the death penalty is exemplified in a recent United States 
Supreme Court decision, in which a plurality of the Court noted as to potential 
jurors who stated they were opposed to the death penalty " •.. despite their initial 
responses, the venire members might have clarified their positions upon further 
questioning and revealed that their concerns about the death penalty were weaker 
than they originally stated •• • "!±. 
The important and complex nature of jury selection is demonstrated by the 
lengthy standard drafted by NLADA concerning the process for all criminal 
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cases.2- The intricacy of the process has led to the creation of specialists in the 
field • .§. Determining what invisible but lethal currents of prejudice may exist in the 
jury pool and how to avoid letting the client be trapped therein may require 
sociological data, psychological expertise, skillful questioning and intuition.I Since 
capital cases demand an even more expansive voir dire than general criminal 
cases,! counsel should consider obtaining the assistance of such a specialist. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Evidence that death qualified juries are more inclined to return a guilty 
verdict was offered in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1; 168 Cal. Rptr. 128; 
616 P.2d 1301 (1980) but was rejected as inconclusive by the California Supreme 
Court. Defendants are not foreclosed from offering (on independent state grounds) 
further evidence to show that death qualification does produce conviction-prone 
juries, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice &: California Public Defenders 
Association, CALIFORNIA DEA TH PENAL TY DEFENSE \-1ANUAL, Vol. I, pg 87E-
l8 through 87E-20 (1987 supplement). 
2. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510; 83 S.Ct. l770; 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 
(1963); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412; 105 S.Ct. 844; 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 
(1983) and Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. ; 106 S. Ct. l758; 90 L. Ed. 2d 137 
( 1986). 
3. An entire issue of Law and Human Behavior was dedicated to death 
qualification in 1984, 8 (No. 1 &: 2) Law and Human Behavior (June 1934); see also 
Balske, Now You See it, Now You Don't: The Demise of the Witherspoon Test and 
Other Important Developments in Death Penalty Defense, The Champion (April 
1985) pg. 22, reprinted in CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE ~,1ANUAL, 
supra note I, Vol. I, pg. E-165. 
4. Gray v. ~ississippi, 431 U.S. _; 107 S. Ct. 2045; 95 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1987). 
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(BNA) 3197 (5/20/87). Gray involved a trial court's refusal to excuse for cause 
some jurors who stated opposition to the death penalty, because the court be lieved 
venire members were simply trying to get off the jury, followed by the court's 
improper excusal for cause (because the prosecutor had exhausted his 
peremptories) of a juror whose initial statements of opposition to the death penalty 
were followed by comments that she could vote to impose a death sentence. 
5. NLADA, Performance Guidelines For Criminal Defense Representation 
(Draft Standard 7 .2); see also ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-
7 .2, commentary. pg 4-82. For an example of an important and complex voir dire 
issue not limited to capital cases, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79; 106 S. Ct. 
1712; 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986) and its progeny , concerning the use of peremptory 
challenges to include potential jurors because of their race. 
6. £:8.:. National Jury Project, JUR YWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES (1 979). 
7. See Nelson, The Stinson Case: A Lawyer's Approach to the Penalty Phase, 
July 1982, from CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 
1, Vol. II, pg. H-25. 
8. State v. Milligan, 708 P. 2d 289,293 (Nev. 1985). 
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STANDARD 11.7.3 OBJECTION TO ERROR AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
FOR POST JUDGMENT REVIEW 
Counsel should consider, when deciding whether to object to legal error and 
whether to assert on the record a position regarding any procedure or ruling, that 
post judgment review in the event of conviction and sentence is likely, and counsel 
should take steps where appropriate to preserve, on all applicable state and Federal 
grounds, any given question for review. 
Commentary: 
While precedent does exist in some jurisdictions stating that 
contemporaneous objection rules may be relaxed in capital cases,.!. cases also 
abound in which capital defendants have been denied review because of trial 
counsel's failure to preserve an issue.l Standards 11.5.1 and 11.9.1 and accompanying 
commentary also address the need to preserve error for review. 
Counsel should not refrain from objecting to or otherwise bringing to the 
attention of the court a perceived injustice not addressed by existing law. Counsel 
should not hesitate to try and change the law, or at least its application in the 
client's case.l 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. ~ Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 793, 810 (.'v\iss. 1984); Stynchcombe v. 
Floyd, 311 S.E.2d 328 (Ga. 1984) (as to instructions at the penalty phase only); Ice v. 
Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671,674 (Ky. 1984). 
2. Ellmann, Instructions on Death: Guiding the Jury's Sentencing Discretion 
in Capital Cases, The Champion (April 1986) pg. 20, 21: "While the decisions 
about whether and how vigorously to press for particular instructions are delicate 
ones, sad experience suggests th§it counsel should at least think very carefully 
before not raising any available legal claim." 
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3. California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and California Public Defender 
Association, CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. I, 
Introduction (1986). 
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STANDARD 11.8.1 OBLIGATION OF COUNSEL AT THE SENTENCING PHASE 
OF DEA TH PENAL TY CASES 
Counsel should be aware that the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial is 
constitutionally different from sentencing proceedings in other criminal cases. 
Commentary: 
All commentary concerning sentencing is found after Standard 11.8.6, the last 
Standard in subsection 11.8. 
STANDARD 11.8.2 DUTIES OF COUNSEL REGARDING SENTENCING OPTIONS, 
CONSEQUENCES AND PROCEDURES 
(a) Counsel should be familiar with the procedures for capital sentencing in 
the given jurisdiction, with the prosecutor's practice in preparing for and 
presenting the prosecution's case at the sentencing phase, and with the caselaw and 
rules regarding what information may be presented to the sentencing entity or 
entities, and how that information may be presented. Counsel should insist that 
the prosecutor adhere to the applicable evidentiary rules unless a valid strategic 
reason exists for counsel not to insist. 
(b) If the client has chosen not to proceed to trial and a plea of guilty or its 
equivalent has been negotiated and entered by counsel in accordance with 
Standards 11.6.1 through 11.6.~, counsel should seek to ensure compliance with all 
portions of the plea agreement beneficial to the client. 
(c) Counsel should seek to ensure that the client is not harmed by improper, 
inaccurate or misleading information being considered by the sentencing entity or 
entities in determining the sentence to be imposed. 
(d) Counsel should ensure that all reasonably available mitigating and 
favorable information consistent with the defense sentencing theory is presented to 
the sentencing entity or entities in the most effective possible way. 
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(e) Counsel should develop a plan for seeking to avoid the death penalty and 
to achieve the least restrictive and burdensome sentencing alternative which can 
reasonably be obtained. 
Commentary: 
All commentary concerning sentencing ls found after Standard 11.8.6, the last 
Standard ln subsection 11.8. 
STANDARD 11.8.3 PREPARATION FOR THE SENTENCING PHASE 
(a) As set out ln Standard 11.4. l, preparation for the sentencing phase, in the 
form of investigation, should begin immediately upon counsel's entry into the case. 
Counsel should seek information to present to the sentencing entity or entities in 
mitigation or explanation of the offense and to rebut the prosecution's sentencing 
case. 
(b) Counsel should discuss with the client early in the case the sentencing 
alternatives available, and the relationship between strategy for the sentencing 
phase and for the guilt/innocence phase. 
(c) Prior to the sentencing phase, counsel should discuss with the client the 
specific sentencing phase procedures of the jurisdiction and advise the client of 
steps being taken in preparation for sentencing. Counsel should discuss with the 
client the accuracy of any information known to counsel that will be presented to 
the sentencing entity or entities, and the strategy for meeting the prosecution's 
case. 
(d) If the client will be interviewed by anyone other than people working with 
defense counsel, counsel should prepare the client for such interv iew(s). Counsel 
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should discuss with the client the possible impact on the sentence and later 
potential proceedings (such as appeal, subsequent retrial or resentencing) of 
statements the client may give in the interviews. 
(e) Counsel should consider, and discuss with the client, the possible 
consequences of having the client testify or make a statement to the sentencing 
entity or entities. 
(f) In deciding which witnesses and evidence to prepare for presentation at 
the sentencing phase, counsel should consider the following: 
(1) Witnesses familiar with and evidence relating to the client's life and 
development, from birth to the time of sentencing, who would be 
favorable to the client, explicative of the offense(s) for which the client 
ls being sentenced, or would contravene evidence presented by the 
prosecutor; 
(2) Expert witnesses to provide medical, psychological, sociological or 
other explanations for the of fense(s) for which the client is being 
sentenced, to give a favorable opinion as to the client's capacity for 
rehabilitation, etc. and/or to rebut expert testimony presented by the 
prosecutor; 
(3) Witnesses with knowledge and opinions about the lack of effectiveness 
of the death penalty itself; 
(4) Witnesses drawn from the victim's family or intimates who are willing 
to speak against killing the client. 
Commentary: 
All commentary concerning sentencing is found after Standard 11.8.6, the last 
Standard in subsection 11.8. 
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STANDARD 11.8.4 THE OFFICIAL PRESENTENCE REPORT 
(a) If an official presentence report or similar document may or will be 
presented to the court at any time, counsel should consider: 
(1) The strategic implications of requesting that an optional report be 
prepared; 
(2) The value of providing to the report preparer information favorable to 
the client. 
(b) Counsel should consider whether the client should speak with the person 
preparing the report and, if so, whether counsel should be present. 
(c) Counsel should review any completed report and take appropriate steps to 
ensure that improper, incorrect or misleading information that may harm the client 
is deleted from the report. 
(d) Counsel should take steps to preserve and protect the client's interest 
regarding material that has been challenged by the defense as improper, inaccurate 
or misleading. 
Commentary: 
All commentary concerning sentencing is found after Standard 11.8.6, the last 
Standard in subsection 11.8. 
STANDARD 11.8.5 THE PROSECUTOR'S CASE AT THE SENTENCING PHASE. 
(a) Counsel should attempt to determine at the earliest possible time what 
aggravating factors the prosecution will rely on in seeking the death penalty and 
what evidence will be offered in support thereof (Standard 11.3). If the jurisdiction 
has rules regarding notification of these factors, counsel should object to any non-
compliance, and if such rules are inadequate, should consider challenging the 
adequacy of the rules. 
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(b) If counsel determines that the prosecutor plans to rely on or offer 
arguably improper, inaccurate or misleading evidence in support of the request for 
the death penalty, counsel should consider appropriate pretrial or trial strategies in 
response. 
Commentary: 
All commentary concerning sentencing is found after Standard 11.8.6, the last 
Standard in subsection 11.8. 
STANDARD 11.8.6 THE DEFENSE CASE AT THE SENTENCING PHASE 
(a) Counsel should present to the sentencing entity or entities all reasonably 
available evidence in mitigation unless there are strong strategic reasons to forego 
some portion of such evidence. 
(b) Among the topics counsel should consider presenting are: 
(1) \1edical history (including mental and physical illness or injury, 
alcohol and drug use, birth trauma and developmental delays); 
(2) Educational history (including achievement, performance and 
behavior), special educational needs (including cognitive limitations and 
learning disabill ties) and opportunity or lack thereof; 
(3) Military service, (including length and type of service, conduct, and 
special training); 
(4) Employment and training history (including skills and performance, 
and barriers to employabillty); 
(5) Family and social history (including physical, sexual or emotional 
abuse, neighborhood surroundings and peer influence); and other cultural 
or religious influence; professional intervention (by medical personnel, 
social workers, law enforcement personnel, clergy or others) or lack 
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thereof; prior correctional experience (including conduct on supervision 
and in institutions, education or training, and clinical services); 
(6) Rehabilitative potential of the client; 
(7) Record of prior offenses (adult and juvenile), especially where there is 
no record, a short record, or a record of non-violent offenses; 
(8) Expert testimony concerning any of the above and the resulting 
impact on the client, relating to the offense and to the client's potential 
at the time of sentencing. 
(c) Counsel should consider all potential methods for offering mitigating 
evidence to the sentencing entity or entities, including witnesses, affidavits, 
reports (including, if appropriate, a defense presentence report which could include 
challenges to inaccurate, misleading or incomplete information contained in the 
official presentence report and/or offered by the prosecution, as well as 
information favorable to the client), letters and public records. 
(d) Counsel may consider having the client testify or speak during the closing 
argument of the sentencing phase. 
Commentary: 
Sentencing proceedings in a capital case resemble a separate trial more than 
they resemble non-capital sentencing proceedings • .!. The Constitutional due 
process right to present evidence, as well as the r ight to counsel, to confront the 
witnesses against the defendant, and to not be placed twice in jeopardy, adhere to 
capital sentencing proceedings.l Experienced criminal counsel familiar with 
sentencing practices in non-capital cases may not recognize the different form of 
advocacy required at a death penalty sentencing trial.l 
The evidence to be presented by the defense -- indeed, the whole theory of 
proceeding -- at the sentencing phase stands outside normal criminal trial practice. 
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Attorneys skilled in narrowing the focus of trial to exclude irrelevant references to 
the life and character of a client may find themselves unprepared for the 
sentencing phase of a capital case where the life and character of the client may 
have to be revealed in detail. The assistance of one or more experts (~ social 
worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, investigator, etc.) may be determinative as to 
outcome,i as set out in Standard l 1.4. 1 (a) and ll .4.l(d)(7).l Unless a plea bargain 
has resulted in a guarantee on the record that the death penalty will not be 
imposed, fuil preparation for a sentencing trial must be made in every case. 
Counsel should consider contacting the victim's family concerning the 
sentencing phase. The 1987 Supplement to the CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY 
DEFENSE MANUAL discusses the power of testimony by a victim's relatives that 
they do not want the defendant killed. It also discusses the fact that the legal 
basis for such testimony is not yet clearly established..2. 
Along the same lines, counsel may consider seeking testimony from witnesses 
familiar with the actual process of an execution or having some expertise on the 
low deterrent value of capital punishment.I The legal basis for such testimony is 
also not yet clearly establishedJ But while counsel cannot be required to offer 
evidence held inadmissible by prevailing caselaw, counsel should consider whether 
such evidence might have value in a given case and whether (if it is barred by 
current caselaw in the jurisdiction) the question of admissibility should be 
preserved for appeal. 
Obviously, the uniqueness of every client makes guidelines as to the sentenc-
ing phase a starting point, not a checklist.2. However, counsel in every capital 
case should consider strategies offered by other attorneys, discussed in the 
literature or otherwise available for consideration. Counsel may not choose, 
without investigation and preparation, to sit back and do nothing at sentencing • .!.Q 
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Even the client may not be able to mandate that counsel present no mitigation, for 
courts have found that public policy should not allow state-assisted suicide.l!. 
Because the scope of evidence admissible in mitigation is generally broader 
than that admissible in aggravation, .!1. counsel may be seeking to adduce evidence 
of a type prohibited to the prosecution. Counsel should be prepared to object to 
inadmissible evidence proffered by the prosecutor. Counsel should also be prepared 
to object to information regarding the client that might be admissible in a non-
capital sentencing proceeding but would constitute a denial of due process in the 
rarified atmosphere of a death penalty case.11 Assertions that the client has 
engaged in unadjudicated criminal conduct have been held to deny due process in at 
least some death penalty cases,li while information regarding uncharged crimes 
may be admissible in the less formal sentencing proceedings occurring in non-
capital cases. 
The goal at the sentencing phase is to help the jury see the client as someone 
they do not want to kill. The decision as to whether to have the client testify can 
be crucial. Especially if the client is not to testify for some strategic reason, 
counsel may consider having the client speaking during the closing argument or to 
h . k. h . ' 15 ot erw1se spea m t e Jury s presence.-
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438-446; 101 S. Ct. 1852; 68 L. Ed. 2d 
270 (1981). 
2. Id.; Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605; 87 S. Ct. 1209; 18 L. Ed. 2d 326 
(1967); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604; 98 S. Ct. 2945, 2981; 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 
(1978). There is, however, no constitutional right to have a jury decide the 
sentence, Spanziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447; 104 S. Ct. 3154: 82 L. Ed. 2d 340 
(1984). 
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3. Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 274 (1983), cited in Weinheimer and Millman, 
Legal Issues Unique to the Penalty Trial, The Champion, pg. 33, reprinted in 
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice &: California Public Defenders 
Association, CALIFORNIA DEA TH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol II, pg H-14 
(l 986). 
4. Stebbins and Kenney, Zen and the Art of Mitigation Presentation, or, the 
Use of Psycho-Social Experts in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial, The 
Champion (Aug. 1986) reprinted in CALIFORNIA DEA TH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, supra note 3, Vol. II, pg. 87H-37 et seq. (1987 Supp.). 
5. Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, Vol. II, pg. 6-1 (1985). 
6. CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 4, Vol. 
I, pg. 87 H-89 (1987 Supplement);~ also Robison v. Maynard, 829 F. 2d 1501 (10th 
Cir. 1987), disallowing such testimony. 
Roy Persons, whose wife Carol was murdered, said in a letter to the St. 
Petersburg (Florida) Times that he would have been "willing to testify in court 
that I or Carol would not have wanted (the defendant) to be sent to his death" but 
that his understanding was that such testimony "would not have been legal." Taken 
from "The Victims Speak", a pamphlet printed by the Institute for Southern Studies. 
7. Balske, New Strategies for The Defense of Capital Cases, 13 Akron Law 
Rev. 331, 358, 359 (1979) reprinted in the CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY 
DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 3. 
8. People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 962; 171 Cal. Rptr. 679; 623 P.2d 240 
(1981) (trial court properly excluded testimony about how the death penalty is 
carried out). State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d 164; 473 N.E.2d 264, 289 (1984) 
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(testimony on nondeterrent value of the death penalty not admissible). See cases 
cited in Dept. of Public Advocacy, KENTUCKY PUBLIC ADVOCATE DEATH 
PENAL TY MANUAL, pg. 328-333 (1983). 
9. CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 3, Vol. 
II , pg. H-4.. 
10. Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 14-67 (8th Cir. 1983). 
11. People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353, 365; 222 Cal. Rptr. 13; 710 P.2d 925 
(1985). 
12. See ~ Green v. Georgia, 4-4-2 U.S. 95; 99 S. Ct. 2150; 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 
(1979) (hearsay offered by the defendant can come in where there were indicia of 
reliability, as a matter of due process). 
13. The United States Supreme Court recently held that victim impact 
statements relating to the effect of a killing on the victim's family may not be 
used by the prosecution at the sentencing phase of a death penalty case. The Court 
specifically distinguished death cases from all others, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
_; 107 S. Ct. 2529; 96 L. Ed. 2d 4-4-0 (1987). 
14.. State v. McCormick, 22 Ind. 272; 397 N.E.2d 276 (1979): but see \Hlton 
v. Procunier, 744, F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984.). 
15. See ~ Balske, Putting It All Together: The Penalty-Phase Closing 
Argument, The Champion, (March, 1984) pg. 47, reprinted in the CALIFORNIA 




ST ANDA RD ll.9.1 DUTIES OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN POST JUDGMENT 
PROCEEDINGS 
(a) Counsel should be familiar with all state and federal post judgment 
options available to the client. Counsel should consider and discuss with the client 
the post judgment procedures that will or may follow imposition of the death 
sentence. 
(b) Counsel should take whatever action, such as filing a claim or notice of 
appeal, is necessary to preserve the client's right -to post judgment review of the 
conviction and sentence. Counsel should consider what other post judgment action, 
if any, counsel could take to maximize the client's opportunity to seek appellate 
and post conviction relief. 
(c) Trial counsel should not cease acting on the client's behalf until 
subsequent counsel has entered the case or trial counsel's representation has been 
formally terminated. 
(d) Trial counsel should cooperate with subsequent counsel concerning 
information regarding trial-level proceedings and strategies. 
Commentary: 
Post judgment procedures, and therefore the duties of counsel, vary among 
jurisdictions • .!. Whatever the procedures, the client should be advised of what will 
happen following the imposition of sentence and potential legal consequences of 
the client's anticipated actions. For example, if the client will be given any 
psychological examination or will otherwise be interviewed by prison personnel or 
others following the court's imposition of sentence, the client should be prepared 
for that interview and advised of the potential legal impact of any statements the 
client might make there • .£ The client should also be advised of all automatic and 
potential judicial review1 and what the client must do (if trial counsel is not going 
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) . 4 to act to secure review.-
Trial counsel should not cease acting on the client's behalf until subsequent 
counsel has entered the case. Not only must the client's post judgment rights be 
protected by filing any necessary documents to preserve the right to appeal or 
other necessary pleadings,1 but the client's personal condition must be monitored 
for potential legal consequences, as set out in Standard 11.9.5 (c). If the client's 
mental condition deteriorates on death row, the client may as a result 
inappropriately decide to cease efforts to secure review, or may even become 
legally ineligible for execution.-2 The "guiding hand" of counselZ. should not be 
removed at this time, absent formal notice to the client and the court, coupled 
with efforts to secure replacement counsel. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. ~ trial counsel in California is given, by statute, certain post judgment 
duties and must remain on the case until the record is certified, Ca l. Penal Code 
Sec. l 240. l(a)(4). In Ohio, new standards for appointment of counsel in capital 
cases indicate that two appellate attorneys must be appointed "where trial counsel 
has been granted leave to withdraw or supplemental counsel is being appointed." 
Rule 65, Qualifications for Eligibility to be Court-Appointed Counsel for Indigent 
Capital Defendant in the Courts of Ohio, adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio 
October 14, 1987, section I B (1). This language implies that trial counsel is 
expected to act beyond the entry of judgment. 
2. California Attorneys for Criminal Justice and California Public Defenders 
Association, CALIFORNIA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. II, pg. 1-38 
through 1-40 (1986). 
3. Several death penalty states provide for automatic review,~ Alabama 
Code 13A-5-55; California Penal Code 1239 (b). 
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4. This comports with the requirements for counsel in all criminal cases, see 
NLADA, Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation (Draft 
Standard 9.2(a) and (b). 
5. See NLADA, Performance Guidelines, supra note 4, (Draft Standard 
9. l(b)(2); 9 .2). 
6. Insane persons may not be executed, Ford v. Wainwright,_ U.S._; 106 
S. Ct. 2595; 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1986). 
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69; 53 S. Ct. 55; 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932). 
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STANDARD 11.9.2 DUTIES OF APPELLATE COUNSEL 
(a) Appellate counsel should be familiar with all state and federal appellate 
and post conviction options available to the client, and should consider how any 
tactical decision might affect later options. 
(b) Appellate counsel should interview the client, and trial counsel if 
possible, about the case, including any relevant matters that do not appear in the 
record. Counsel should consider whether any potential off-record matters should 
have an impact on how the appeal is pursued, and whether an investigation of any 
matter is war ranted. 
(c) Appellate counsel should communicate with the client concerning both 
the substance and procedural status of the appeal. 
(d) Appellate counsel should seek, when perfecting the appeal, to present all 
arguably meritorious issues, including challenges to any overly restrictive appellate 
rules. 
(e) Appellate counsel should cooperate with any subsequent counsel concern-
ing information about the appellate proceedings and strategies, and about info rma-
t ion obtained by appellate counsel concerning earlier stages of the case. 
Commentary: 
Practice varies among jurisdictions as to the limits of the appellate process 
and the relationship between direct appeals and collateral post conviction 
challenges to a conviction or sentence. Issues that are only partially or minimally 
reflected by the record, or that are outside the record, should be explored by 
appellate counsel even if such issues will not-- for procedural or tactical reasons--
be raised until later .l Such issues may affect the manner in which appellate issues 
are raised. For example, if a strong ineffective assistance of trial counsel issue 
exists off the record, appellate counsel might consider that a factor in deciding 
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how to present to the appellate courts a very novel issue preserved on the record. 
Maintaining contact with the client during the direct appeal is important. All 
attorneys, of course, have a duty to keep their clients informed of case 
developments,.£ but counsel in a death penalty case must also monitor the client's 
personal situation for possible legal consequences as set out in Standard l l.9.5(c) 
3 and the Commentary to Standard 11.9.1.-
Traditional theories of appellate practice notwithstanding, appellate counsel 
in a capital case should~ raise only the best of several potential issues.i Issues 
abandoned by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in another case and 
ultimately successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed later. When a client will be 
killed if the case is lost, counsel (and the courts) should not let any possible ground 
for relief go unexplored or unexploited. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEA TH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, Vol. II, pg. 8-3 ~~ (1985). 
2. ABA Standards, The Defense Function, Standard 4-3.8. 
3. See also, INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 1, 
pg. 8-1, 8-2. 
4. " .•. Chief Justice Burger argues that '(t)here can hardly be any question 
about the importance of having the appellate advocate examine the record .•• to 
select (only) the most promising issues for review •.• ' Jones v Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 
3308, 3314 (1983). This is truly bad advice in capital cases -- at any level. If the 
past few years teach us anything, it is to raise 'em all. Remember, the Chief 
Justice also told us that '(t)he signals from this Court have not ••• been easy to 
decipher.' Lockett v Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978)." McNally, Death is Different: 
Your Approach to a Capital Case \itust be Different, Too, The Champion (\iiarch 
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1984), pg. 8, 12, reprinted in California Attorneys for Criminal Justice &: California 
Public Defenders Association, CALIFORNIA DEA TH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, Vol. I, pg. A-33(1986). The INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, supra note 1, recommends that counsel approach the traditional 
"winnowing process" with extreme caution, Vol. III, pg. 8-7. 
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STANDARD 11.9.3 DUTIES OF POST CONVICTION COUNSEL 
(a) Post conviction counsel should be familiar with all state and federal post 
conviction remedies available to the client. 
(b) Post conviction counsel should interview the client, and previous counsel 
if possible, about the case. Counsel should consider conducting a full investigation 
of the case, relating to both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases. Post 
conviction counsel should obtain and review a complete record of all court 
proceedings relevant to the case. With the consent of the client, post conviction 
counsel should obtain and review all prior counsels' file(s). 
(c) Post conviction counsel should seek to present to the appropriate court or 
courts all arguably meritorious issues, including challenges to overly restrictive 
rules governing post conviction proceedings. 
Commentary: 
Post conviction proceedings, perceived as a "second (or third) bite at the 
apple", have been under attack by courts seeking to limit theml and by legislators 
seeking to limit or abolish them .l Yet, the high percentage of defendants who 
receive relief when represented by counsel in post conviction proceedingsl 
indicates that substantial error is not being prevented or c ured at earlier stages, 
see commentary accompanying Standard I.I. Condemned defendants la ter shown to 
be innocent have been saved from death by post conviction relief after direct 
appeal had failed.i Post conviction counsel could be called a condemned 
defendant's last, best hope.2• 
Capital post conviction work requires enormous amounts of time, energy and 
knowledge to do an adequate job • .2. The changing nature of post conviction work, 
along with the varied rules in the different jurisdictions, mandate the rather 
general nature of these Standards.I Counsel representing a capital client must 
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become familiar with the procedures of the given jurisdiction and act accordingly. 
Post conviction counsel should review the entire case. The record of all 
preliminary hearings, pretrial motions, post trial motions and any other court 
proceedings should be reviewed along with the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, 
as well as the appellate record. Issues that have developed in the wake of changing 
law may be evident to post conviction counsel even though they were not apparent 
to prior counsel.! Possible deficiencies in the performance of prior counsel can be 
evaluated only after review of the record, the files of prior counsel and discussion 
with the client. 
Any change in the availability of post conviction relief may itself provide an 
issue for further litigation. This is especially true if the change occurred after the 
case was begun and could be argued to have affected strategic decisions along the 
way. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. See Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious 
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, XIV N. Y .U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change, 
797, 838 et seg. ( 1986). 
2. For example, an Illinois state legislator announced plans to introduce a bill 
"calling for a 'statute of limitations on the filing of post convict ion appeals"' as 
part of his scheme to expedite the execution of defendants sentenced to death, 
Illinois Coalition Against the Death Penalty, Bulletin, April 16, 1987 pg. 2. 
3. Tabak, The Death of Fairness, supra note 1, at pg. 830-831. 
4. Shabaka Sundiati Waqlimi, formerly known as Joseph Green Brown, served 
fourteen years on Florida's death row before obtaining post conviction relief. The 
11th Circuit overturned his conviction on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The prosecutor had allowed the co-defendant who inculpated Waqlimi to testify 
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that he (the co-defendant) had not been given a deal in exchange for his testimony, 
even though a deal had been made. The prosecutor then argued the absence of a 
deal to the jury in an attempt to enhance the co-defendant's credibility. Even 
though the 11th Circuit did not reach other issues, evidence concealed from the 
jury by the prosecution showed that the bullet that killed the victim could not have 
been fired from Waqlimi's gun, and that the semen found in the victim came from a 
man with a blood type different from that of Waqlimi. A year after the l l th 
Circuit overturned the conviction, all charges against Waqlimi were dropped, 
Innocent Man Released After 14 Years on Death Row, Vol. 14 Southern Coalition 
Report (Spring 1987). 
5. The phrase "last, best hope" is taken from Abraham Lincoln's Annual 
Message to Congress, 1862, Kerner, A Treasury of Lincoln Quotations, pg. 91 
(1965): "In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free--honorable 
alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save or meanly lose 
the last, best hope of earth." 
6. See American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defense, Bar Information Program (prepared by The Spangenberg Group), 
Time and Expense Analysis in Post Conviction Death Penalty Cases (February, 
1987) pg. 22. 
7. Because there is no recognized federal constitutional right to post 
conviction counsel, even the minimal guidance offered by federal ineffective 
assistance of counsel caselaw is lacking this area,~ Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S._; 107 S. Ct. 1990; 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987) (no federal constitutional right to 
counsel for collateral attack on conviction; where state provided appointed 
counsel, no federal constitutional right to have Anders procedures followed when 
that attorney finds no basis to proceed). 
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8. An example is the case of Warren Mccleskey. His conviction and death 
sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court in \kCleskey v. Kemp, __ U.S. 
__; 107 S. Ct. 1756; 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987). Shortly thereafter, a liberalization 
of Georgia's open records law allowed McCleskey's attorney to examine files in the 
city attorney's office. The information obtained led to a stay of execution, Death 
Row Inmate Prevails--Finally, National Law J, January 11, 1988, at 24. 
Subsequently, McCleskey's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted, based 
on the information received as a result of the open records law change, \kCleskey 
\i\urder Conviction Overturned Again, The Atlanta Constitution, December 24, 
1987, at 1 and after; see, McCleskey v. Kemp, IIC87-1517A (N.D. Ga. December 
23, 1987). 
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STANDARD 11.9.4 DUTIES OF CLEMENCY COUNSEL 
(a) Clemency counsel should be familiar with the procedures for and permis-
sible substantive content of a request for clemency. 
(b) Clemency counsel should interview the client, and any prior attorneys if 
possible, and conduct an investigation to discover information relevant to the 
clemency procedure applicable in the jurisdiction. 
(c) Clemency counsel should take appropriate steps to ensure that clemency 
is sought in as timely and persuasive a manner as possible. 
Commentary: 
Whether new counsel is appointed or counsel representing the client in other 
post judgment procedures handles the request for clemency,.!. the manner in which 
clemency is dispensed in the jurisdiction will control what should be done.1 Counsel 
should be familiar with the governorl or other clemency-dispenser, and wlth the 
factors the clemency-dispenser has historically found persuasive. If doubts about 
the fairness of the judicial proceedings that produced the death sentence have led 
to clemency in other cases, counsel should consider whether particular instances of 
procedural unfairness can be set out as to the client's case (requiring a familiarity 
with the legal history of the case). If personal characteristics of the condemned 
have proven helpful in past clemency proceedings, then counsel should mobilize an 
especially detailed investigation to discover and demonstrate examples of the 
client's similar characteristics to the extent possible. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. The Florida Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, created by 
statute to represent indigents in post conviction proceedings in capital cases, is 
empowered to represent such clients in courts, Fla. Stat. Ann. 27.702, not in 
clemency proceedings. 
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2. For example in Georgia, the Board of Pardons and Paroles handles all 
requests for clemency, Ga. Const. 1983, art. 4, sec. 2, par. 2. In Florida, the 
governor may commute punishment or grant pardons only with the approva l of 
three members of the Cabinet, Fla. Stat. Ann. 940.01 (1). In Indiana, the parole 
board makes recommendations to the governor, Indiana Public Defender Council, 
INDIANA DEATH PENAL TY DEFENSE MANUAL, Vol. III, pg. 8-36 (1985). 
3. See generally, Dept. of Public Advocacy, KENTUCKY PUBLIC 
ADVOCATE DEATH PENAL TY MANUAL, pg. 533-537. 
- 117 -
" ' I • 
.w \ l 6, 
STANDARD 11.9.5 DUTIES COMMON TO ALL POST JUDGMENT COUNSEL 
(a) Counsel representing a capital client at any point after imposition of the 
death sentence should be familiar with the procedures by which execution dates are 
set and how notification of that date is made. Counsel should also be familiar with 
the procedures for seeking a stay of execution from all courts in which the case 
may be lodged when an execution date is set. 
(b) Counsel should take immediate steps to seek a stay of execution, and to 
appeal from any denial of a stay, in any and all available courts when an execution 
date is set. 
(c) Counsel should continually monitor the client's mental, physical and 
emotional condition to determine whether any deterioration in the client's 
condition warrants legal action. 
Commentary: 
In non-capital cases, appellate and post conviction counsel may experience 
pressure to file pleadings so that a defendant will not serve several undeserved 
years in prison before the case ls resolved. If a defendant ls free on appeal bond, 
there may even be pressure to file pleadings on the last possible day. Only in 
capital cases does counsel face the possibility that a pleading may be dismissed as 
moot following the client's execution • .!. 
When too-short periods of time for filing substantive post judgment-~- plead-
ings compete with the need to stay the execution so that substantive pleadings will 
be considered, the result is last-minute requests for stays) Counsel cannot obviate 
an insane system; developing familiarity with the procedures in question prior to 
accepting a capital case so that stays can be sought as efficiently as possible is the 
only ameliorative step counsel can take. (It is assumed that, given time, counsel 
would also litigate the unfairness of any overly-restrictive constraints on filing of 
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substantive pleadings and/or stays). 
As described in the commentary to Standard 11.9.1, a deterioration in the 
client's mental condition may directly affect the legal posture of the case. For 
example, insane persons cannot be executed.!±. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Sloan, Death Row Clerk, The New Republic (February 16, 1987). 
2. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Ai-bitr~ry and Capricious Imposition of 
The Death Penalty in the 1980s, XIV N. Y .U. Rev. L. &. Soc. Change 797, 834 (1986). 
3. When a capital case enters a phase of being "under warrant" -- i. !:.:. when a 
death warrant has been signed -- time comm itments for counsel increase, "due in 
large part to the necessary duplication of effort in the preparation of several 
petitions which might have to be filed simultaneously in different courts." 
American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent !::>efense, 
Bar Information Program, Time &. Expense Analysis in Post-Conviction Death 
Penalty Cases (February, 1937), pg. 10. 
See, Indiana Public Defender Council, INDIANA DEA TH PENAL TY DEFENSE 
MANUAL, Vol. lll, pg. 8-2 through 8-3, 8-11, S-16, and 8-27 through S-29 (1985), 
setting out the various stages at which a stay rnay need to be sought. Counsel 
should be aware prior to the setting of an execution date of the procedures of the 
particular courts from which stays may be requested. 
4. Ford v. Wainwright, __ U.S._; 106 S. Ct. 2595; 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 
( 1986). 
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